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Abstract 
Recent events in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and across the United States have resulted in scrutiny 
of the use of militarization by state and local law enforcement. Militarization in and of its self is 
not a new concept, particularly to formal agents of social control. Supporters of militarization 
argue that militarization was necessary. Opponents argue that it discriminates and places 
disadvantaged communities at risk. What is known is that over the course of its implementation, 
militarization has become institutionalized in social, political, and economic agencies. This 
institutionalization has resulted in militarization not remaining confined solely to the United 
States. Legislation, immigration policy, and law enforcement militarization propelled the 
militarization of the southern border in the early 2000’s. Prior to this, Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTO’s) in Mexico begin showing signs of militarization in 1980. The adoption of 
“narco” tanks, grenades, body armor, and use of tactics such as ambushes and tunnels, assisted in 
the increasing violence and influence of the cartels within Mexico and the United States. This 
issue provides a unique opportunity for researchers to provide qualitative and quantitative data 
that showcase the large-scale impact of legislation. Understanding the impact of militarization 
legislation and its influence on both law enforcement and crime syndicates will assist 
policymakers in balancing national security with reformation of law enforcement, ultimately 
affecting border operations. Current literature examines the indicators of cartel militarization, the 
impact of militarization within the United States and Mexico but does not address the direct 
pacing of the process. Utilizing qualitative and quantitative data, gathered from open-source 
news publications in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Mexico, Nogales, Arizona/Nogales Mexico, 
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and El Paso, Texas/Ciudad Juarez Mexico, the author researched the pace of the militarization of 
the crime syndicates along the U.S -Mexico border, compared it to the pace of the local United 
States law enforcement militarization, and identified any relationship between the two. The 
findings of the author’s research suggest a positive correlation between the major Mexican 
cartel’s militarization and United States law enforcement militarization. Specifically, that the 
cartels militarization mirrored the militarization of law enforcement both within the United 
States and Mexico based on legislation, federal operations, and direct news sources. 
Furthermore, the research suggests that the militarization of the US-Mexico border by law 
enforcement through legislation correlates to the crime syndicates, facing more militaristic 
methods, response by adapting their methods, equipment, and tactics. This has sociopolitical and 
economic policy implications that the militarization of the US-Mexico border is a vicious cycle 
(academic and policy impacts in that this protective increase in militarization was a self-
perpetuating cycle) that has negatively affected the quality of life along the border and possibly 
increased the exploitation of border communities by both crime syndicates and law enforcement. 
Future research will be able to expound on the quantitative points at the doctoral level to quantify 
the magnitude of the correlation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Militarization formally began in the United States in the 1980s (foundation laid in the 
1960’s) with the formation and use of SWAT capabilities (Kraska 2007). The initiative was then 
made more accessible to law enforcement in the 1990s with the passage of the Defense 
Authorization Act of 1997 which created the 1033 program. The 1033 program applied to the 
southern border after 9/11 when law enforcement and border security was consolidated under the 
Department of Homeland Security. It was then applied to the southern border as a response to 
increased concerns about drug trafficking and unauthorized immigration in the 2000s. Recent 
events in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and across the United States reopened the discussion of the 
use of militarization by state and local law enforcement. For many, the discussion may seem a 
new issue but history has shown that militarization is not new to state and local law enforcement.  
It began in the 1960s when it was used for riot control in America’s “burning” cities and the 
1980s and 1990s saw the heavy use of SWAT.  In the post-Dessert Storm and Operation 
Enduring Freedom years, police received authorization from the Defense Department (1033 
program) to use excess military equipment.  This scrutiny has resulted in supporters of 
militarization arguing that militarization was necessary as a deterrent and a tool for proactive 
policing whereas opponents argue militarization discriminates and places disadvantaged 
communities at risk (Mummolo 2018). 
This argument can be applied in a larger concept because militarization is not confined to 
the United States and is a world-wide issue. Bolduc (2016) discusses the shift towards 
militarized policing stemming from the concept of risk that has driven nations to amend their 
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laws so that their law enforcement agencies may militarize (Bolduc 2016). In the United States, 
the shift towards militarized police occurred with the developing war on drugs in the 1960s and 
the 1970s (Kraska 2007). At the time, Columbia and Mexico were the largest producers and 
traffickers of drugs to the United States and they became a focus for enforcement (Beittel 2019). 
They responded by gaining new tactics as well as equipment. In this sense, they, too, 
“militarized.” 
The Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO’s) in Mexico, hereby referred to as cartels, 
began showing signs of militarization before the United States created SWAT (Lachicotte 2013). 
The adoption of “narco” tanks, grenades, body armor, and use of tactics such as ambushes and 
tunnels, resulted in the increasing dominance of the cartels within Mexico and the increasing 
influence within Mexican government agencies and the United States (Sullivan and Elkus 2011). 
Recent Events Within the United States 
In 2014, the events in Ferguson, Missouri resulted in large-scale protests. These were 
renewed in 2019 with the death of George Floyd (Moule, Fox, and Parry 2019). Administrative 
actions at the federal level have attempted to address the availability of militarized equipment. 
President Obama ordered a review of the use of the military equipment transfer program after 
law enforcement used military armored vehicles and weapons to control protesters in Ferguson, 
Missouri. Since then, there have been calls to “defund the police” and measures taken at the city 
and state levels to scale back the current level of militarization within law enforcement (Radil, 
Raymond, and McAden 2017). Particularly, the use of military-grade armored vehicles and 
military tactics have become a source of contention (Mummolo 2019). Lawmakers have replied 
to this pressure by reaching out to researchers and asking how to balance the need for security 
with raising the standards of policing (The Constitution Project 2015). 
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Statement of the Problem.  
Within the United States, the use of military weapons and tactics by local law 
enforcement agencies presents a variety of concerns. These include violation of freedom of 
speech, the right of unreasonable searches and seizures as well as a violation of due process and 
equal protection (The Constitution Project 2015).  As a result of the events in 2014 and 2019, 
there has been an increase in federal challenges, such as the use of devices in searches and the 
expectation of privacy, as well as more focus on passing legislation to reduce militarization (The 
Constitution Project 2015).  
Due to the shared border with Mexico, any legislation that addresses the militarization of 
law enforcement within the United States will directly impact the cartels that traffic people and 
products across the border by forcing them to adapt their methods to evade detection and 
successfully achieve their means (Reid 2009). It also impacts migrants that make the journey 
across the border seeking better opportunities, through increased exploitation, by increasing their 
reliance on cartels for protection and movement across the border (Broderick 2019).  
Understanding the way that legislation impacts both law enforcement and crime 
syndicates will assist policymakers in tempering the need for security with the desire to reform 
law enforcement and how that will ultimately affect border operations. Ultimately, this provides 
a unique opportunity for researchers to provide data, both qualitative as well as quantitative that 
showcase the large-scale impact of legislation. 
Identified Research Gap 
Due to recent events, there has been an increased focus on the militarization of law 
enforcement within the United States. However, scholars have mainly discussed the impacts on 
local communities rather than crime syndicates themselves (Mummolo 2019).  
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Identified literature discusses indicators of cartel militarization, the impact of 
militarization within the United States and Mexico, as well as provides a historical timeframe of 
militarization but does not directly address the pacing of all three processes (Fundora 2018). This 
leaves the questions: How did the United States' militarization of law enforcement and the 
southern border impact the pace at which the cartels militarize? How did the criminal syndicates 
adapt to and in some cases drive, this process? This identified research gap merits research due 
to the need for policy makers to understand the global impact of the legislation they pass to 
influence and combat the response of law enforcement to both internal and external stressors.  
Flores et al (2019) discuss and describe how law enforcement has become increasingly 
militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and 
soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. They discuss how scholars have 
neglected the study of three main areas: 1) the introduction of the idea of the constabularization 
of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law 
enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United 
States, and 3) its political consequences (Flores et al 2019).  
Discussion of the militarization of the border is an important issue that has multiple 
implications for both the United States and Mexico (Goodman and Marizco 2010). In Mexico, 
militarization affects, and possibly increases, the power vacuum that exists and undermines the 
legitimacy of the government (Heyman and Campbell 2012). In the United States, militarization 
of the border was an intensive, expensive, process that may or may not be successful (Lachicotte 
2013). The application of legislation to increase or decrease immigration or law enforcement 
practices has secondary effects on border communities that then require secondary resources to 
combat (Lowden 2013). 
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Understanding the pace of crime syndicate militarization in relation to law enforcement 
militarization, as well as possible root causes, is important for numerous reasons. The first is that 
any attempt to reform border polices/immigration tactics must take in to account potential 
responses from cartels to be successful (López-González 2012). In addition, any reformation of 
law enforcement militarization may result in similar reformation in cartels actions which will 
allow for greater policy impact. Overall, militarization of the border, may result in increased 
exploitation of communities which then require increased dedication of finite resources and 
manpower to combat (Lowden 2013). Reallocation of these assets then leaves other vulnerable 
areas open to criminal influence (Lowden 2013).  Researchers can utilize this research to reduce 
border exploitation, reduce militarization of law enforcement, re-allot law enforcement assets 
primarily focused on community policing practices, then policy makers could implement 
practices that build trust in law enforcement.  
The biggest impact of understanding the pace of cartel militarization regarding law 
enforcement within the United States is the application in communities along the southern border 
that live within both worlds (López-González 2012). These communities have a vested interest in 
understanding cartel militarization and how to best address it. By identifying the pace of cartel 
militarization in regards to law enforcement militarization, border communities can cooperate 
with policy makers to create policies that provide maximum community benefits with minimum 
protective response from cartels. 
Secondary impacts will be felt within the immigration community. Despite historical 
efforts by legislators to control immigration across the U.S-Mexico border, the last two decades 
have seen an increase in immigration to the United States (Urbina and Ilse 2019 Dansby 2020). 
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During this time, Central American and Mexican immigration has been influenced by 
gang violence, organized crime, police corruption, and the state’s inability to combat the two 
(Walser 2008a; Walser 2008b). In particular, “loss of jobs, displacement from agriculture, and 
poverty have driven people from their home countries to countries of historic or contemporary 
economic ties” (Wolfe 2007, 6).  
Finally, law enforcement at the border and within the United States (interior) will be 
directly impacted by future legislation. In particular, the Border Patrol relies heavily on the use 
of enhanced equipment and tactics to both fulfill the agency's mission as well as try to save as 
many lives as possible (Demarest 1997; Dunn 1999). By understanding how the militarization of 
one aspect influences the other, preventative measures can be built into future legislation and 
alternative means/focus can be implemented. 
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of the author’s research was to conduct exploratory research to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. How, when, and at what pace did police militarize in the United States?  
2. How, when, and at what pace did cartels militarize in Mexico? 
3. How have both police and cartel militarization been framed in the media? 
This research is significant to the extent that it can open dialogue with local law 
enforcement leaders, revise community interactions, and enhance involvement from both law 
enforcement personnel and the people they serve. The academic contributions will inform and 
shape policy makers' decisions and serve as the basis for continuing research that will help shape 
the future of militarization as well as the interaction between the United States and Mexico. 
 To begin looking at correlations between the pace of law enforcement within the United 
States and the cartels in Mexico, the author first mapped the pace of the two individually. The 
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author included historical data, incorporated legislative timelines, operational timelines, and 
border militarization reports. Once these timelines were generated, the author then compared the 
two and identified any patterns through content analysis. Once the timelines were developed and 
analyzed, the author gathered current news sources to determine how the militarization is framed 
within media along the border. This allowed the author to identify themes in actual phenomena, 
as well as patterns in discourse/rhetoric.  
Utilizing qualitative and quantitative data, the author found that the pace of militarization 
of the local crime syndicates along the U.S -Mexico border mirrored the militarization of law 
enforcement both within the United States and Mexico. The militarization by law enforcement 
through legislation suggest that the crime syndicates, facing increased militaristic methods, 
adapted their methods, equipment, and tactics to mirror those used against them. This indicates a 
self-perpetuating cycle of rising enforcement and increased militarization that affects the 
exploitation of border communities by crime syndicates. 
Research Problems  
1. How, when, and at what pace did police militarize in the United States?  
2. How, when, and at what pace did cartels militarize in Mexico? 
3. Compare the pace of local United States law enforcement to the pace of the cartels. 
4. Examine the relationship, if any, between the two. 
5. Determine how have both police and cartel militarization been framed in the media? 
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Chapter 2 The Militarization of Law Enforcement Within the United States 
Figure 1 
Recent events in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and across the country have resulted in 
renewed scrutiny of the use of militarization by state and local law enforcement in the United 
States (Munoz, 2013). The debate on the subject is not a new one and it has existed since the 
inception of militarized methods in the 1980s (Kraska 2007, Torres and Gurevich 2008, 
Hernández 2010, Coyne and Hall 2013, Constitution Project 2015, NPR 2019). While one area 
of focus has been on the use of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, in the last four 
years, there has been additional scrutiny on the use of military-grade equipment and tactics (The 
Constitution Project 2015). 
Current policing practices focus on community policing approaches that were adopted in 
the 1980’s (Hodges 1997; Kraska and Keppler 1997). A key aspect of this theory was the heavy 
reliance on the community as a partner to solve and prevent crime. This partnership was built on 
trust, community involvement, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. During the same 
timeframe, however, the United States also saw a rise in the militarization of law enforcement to 
include the use of SWAT teams and military weapons (Kraska 2007). Since then, “domestic 
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policing in the United States has become increasingly militarized” and has taken on the 
characteristics of the armed forces (Coyne and Hall 2013:486).  
One of the first indicators of the militarization within the United States occurred in 1967 
when the Los Angeles Police Department created the first paramilitary police response unit in 
response to the Watts riots (Kraska 2007, The Constitution Project 2015, Bolduc 2016). This unit 
won widespread public and political support because of high-profile engagements with groups 
such as the Black Panthers, and other similar units began to form shortly thereafter (Bolduc 
2016). Widespread militarization would not be fully adopted until the 1980’s with the official 
formation of SWAT.  
Originally, SWAT was conceived as a more militarized part of local law enforcement, 
with the specific mission to deploy on a limited basis in high-risk situations (Kraska 2007). As 
both money and equipment became more available to support these teams, however, their use 
spread widely (Kraska 2007). When the “War on Drugs” escalated in the 1980s, the number of 
SWAT teams increased rapidly and they were used more frequently for routine police work such 
as executing search warrants (Kraska and Kappeler 1997) (The Constitution Project 2015). To 
illustrate how rapidly these teams grew, in the late 1990s, “90% of cities and towns and 65% of 
mid-sized cities had a SWAT team” (The Constitution Project 2015:4). This was an increase of 
approximately 1500% from 1980 to 2000 (The Constitution Project 2015) (Britt 2018).  
Unfortunately, with the increase in these militarized units, community policing suffered 
and performance decreased (Kraska 2007, Bolduc 2016, Michalowski 2020). This was supported 
through research showing that when departments are militarized, indicators of successful 
performance decrease and communities began to fear the police departments rather than trust 




To be successful we need to understand how militarization became mainstream and 
answer the questions: What was the intent of militarization? What was the purpose of 
militarization? What has been the goal of providing law enforcement military-styled equipment 
and tactics?  
Militarization is an enforcement tool that creates a perpetual cycle. First, Militarization is 
a policy that attempts to addresses deviance. It does this by utilizing the policy that has its origin 
in “state” efforts to maintain social control/social order. Deviance creates crime, crime creates 
deviance. Actors want to decrease both crime and deviance. Strategies over the years have 
resulted in the militarization of law enforcement through legislation. This 
legislation/militarization has secondary impacts, such as the cartels militarizing to meet the 
threat. This mirrors the perpetual cycle of crime and deviance. In essence, we create the issue by 
trying to fix the issue. We then must increase our efforts to address the new issue that we created, 
repeating the cycle. This is supported through research in this paper.  
Some would argue that militarization was intended to prevent crime (Kraska 1997). The 
author would argue that the foundation of militarization is deviance. To elaborate, the author 
claims can be boiled down to “Laws create crime, crime influences/creates laws”.  Selected 
research supports the fact that legislation was created to address deviance (in this case, drugs) 
and made crimes of acts that were legal up until this point (working in the U.S. by day, returning 
to Mexico by night) (Ajilore 2017). Once this was made illegal (or more difficult), laws were 
created to address the rising number of people trying to come to the U.S. This then created more 
“deviants” that influenced harsher laws (through militarization, which spread to the 
institutionalization of social, political, economic aspects). 
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Academically, deviance is defined as “violations of norms, or departures from social 
expectations” (Lemert 1972:13). Some examples include crime, delinquency, prostitution, drug 
addiction, and sometimes even physical handicaps (1972). Other examples include suppression 
of speech, normalization of societal behavior, and intimidation.  Early definitions state that 
“deviance reinforces the boundaries of acceptable moral behavior in society and provides 
concrete examples of the consequences of normative violations (Durkheim 1938) (Kappler 
1994:255). In a sense, deviance lends unity to our image of the fundamental fairness of the 
existing social order by reinforcing cohesiveness while maintaining the boundaries of moral 
behavior (Kappler 1994). In essence, the study of deviance is the basis of the study of crime. In 
summary, without deviance, there is no crime and we create deviance when we create crime. 
This is supported through the work of Edward Lemert and his views that rather than deviance 
resulting in social controls, social controls result in deviance (1972). According to Lemert, 
secondary deviance is a logical extension of social control because deviance is established in 
social roles and then perpetuated by the forces that seek to control it (1972). 
This is important because crime and deviance controls are consistently changing due to 
political influence, societal needs, and social events. Militarization is no different. As a result, 
what we consider deviant as well as what we consider militarized consistently changes. This 
change both frustrates and emboldens the actors that influence it. The ability to recognize how to 
understand the nature of deviance allows these actors to better formulate responses and 
preventative methods to assist rather than prosecute deviants. This supports the author’s desire to 
reframe how approaches to militarization within law enforcement are handled.  
Because of the broad range of this topic, researchers have had to approach deviance in 
multiple ways. To further explore this “no one size fits all” aspect, there have been many theories 
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that have developed over the years that approach deviance from the sociological, behavioral, and 
psychological perspectives. 
Theories Concerning Militarization 
United States 
Risk theory.  
 Applying Giddens's and Beck's theory of risk, the United States and its local law 
enforcement system appear to have undergone militarization because of the risks presented by 
the transnational drug trade (Bolduc, 2016). First, the military needed a task to complete, after 
the conclusion of the Cold War (Bolduc, 2016:105). Without the threat of nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union, and later Russia, looming, U.S. society was actively attempting to break away 
from the issue that plagued it since the Iron Curtain fell (Bolduc, 2016). The United States 
believed that the transnational drug trade constituted a risk, a danger that could cause trouble to 
its citizens in the present and the future (Bolduc, 2016). The drugs being transported into the 
United States posed a new external risk; one being orchestrated by transnational actors over 
which no government possessed control (Bolduc, 2016).  
The threat of spillover violence also followed the transnational drug trade (Bolduc, 
2016:110). These fears led to the gradual evolution from a warfare state, one that was actively 
engaged in the Vietnam War, to a "crime fare" state (Bolduc, 2016:110). Law enforcement 
became increasingly integrated with the military under presidential and congressional policies 
and narcotics were addressed as a national security matter, permitting the inclusion of the 
military-in technology, equipment, and expertise in local law enforcement actions (Bolduc, 
2016). As a result, local agencies all over the United States gradually shifted to a militarized 
policing approach (Bolduc, 2016). Due to these transnational threats, SWAT spread throughout 
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the United States (Bolduc, 2016). These teams specialized in responding to atypical and 
dangerous situations such as riots and hostage-taking, scenarios the standard police officer would 
not typically encounter.  
Mexico 
In Mexico, risk theory does not apply as much as social contract theory because of the 
cartel's militarization’s in the actions of the cartels themselves, the farmers, and to some extent 
the militiamen in the U.S. when lawmakers did not make any immigration progress, 
Social contract theory. 
  Thomas Hobbes proposed that a society without rules and laws to govern our actions 
would be a dreadful place to live (Moule 2018). Hobbes described a society without rules as 
living in a “state of nature” (Moule 2018). In such a state, people would act on their own accord, 
without any responsibility to their community (Moule 2018). Life in a state of nature would be 
Darwinian, where the strongest survive and the weak perish (Moule 2018). A society, in Hobbes’ 
state of nature, would be without the comforts and necessities that we take for granted in modern 
western society (Moule et al. 2018). While social contract theory does not tell people how they 
ought to behave, it does provide a basis to understand why society has implemented rules, 
regulations, and laws (Evans and MacMillan, 2014). If not for the social contract theory, our 
understanding of the need for these rules would be limited (Evans and MacMillan, 2014). 
Specifically, for law enforcement, social contract theory is important to justify the power that 
law enforcement can exert over the population (Evans and MacMillan, 2014). The power 
imbalance, held by law enforcement, is part of the contract that society has agreed upon in 
exchange for security. Where the contract can be problematic is when the power used by law 
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enforcement exceeds what is expected by the society under the contract (McCartney and Parent 
2012). 
Rational choice theory.  
 The concern in Mexico is that the cartels themselves are acting as law enforcement 
agents. They create the laws that they enforce through fear and death. This hinders legitimacy at 
all levels. As a result, the people directly impacted by the cartels must make a choice. Recognize 
and fight a corrupt entity or conform to the cartel’s expectations. Often, they utilize the 
protective theme and chose to follow the cartel's orders. This then gives the cartels legitimacy. 
 Rational choice theories contend that individuals evaluate the potential costs and benefits 
of possible actions (Moule et al 2018). These evaluations, in turn, shape individual behavior 
(Moule 2018). “Assessments of these possible consequences are not random; rather, paralleling 
the notion of psychological anchors, they vary as a function of individual dispositions and 
normative orientations” (Moule 2018:81). Specifically, “the perceived consequences of a 
behavior should provide indirect pathways between individual dispositions and behaviors” 
(Moule 2018:81). In this case, the perceived consequences of empowerment should link 
legitimacy and the willingness to empower police, rather than cartel.  
Studies Concerning Militarization 
Studies performed by Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Michelle Keck, and José Nava (2015) 
show that para militarization and federal operations are significantly related to drug-related 
homicides in the Mexican states, due to the exploitation of the crime syndicates. Using a times 
series cross-sectional model data set from 2007-2010 for 32 Mexican states, the fixed-effects 
“Poisson-based negative binomial regression model” evaluates the impact of seven independent 
variables on drug-related violence for each Mexican state (Guadalupe et al. 2015). The 
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dependent variable was drug-related violence, which was operationalized as the total number of 
drug-related homicides per state per year from 2007 to 2010 (Guadalupe et al. 2015).  
The study included seven independent variables, including para militarization of Mexican 
criminal syndicates, divisions between and within transnational criminal groups, the presence or 
absence of federal troops, three socioeconomic variables (gross domestic product (GDP), 
unemployment, and foreign direct investment (FDI)) and corruption (Guadalupe et al. 2015). 
Researchers found that the presence of organized crime groups increases drug-related homicides 
by 1.164 (Guadalupe et al. 2015). Their results indicate that the para militarization of TCO 
enforcement groups has resulted in harsh and violent control practices that have led to an 
increase in drug-related homicides throughout Mexico (Guadalupe et al. 2015). The presence of 
federal operations has an even greater effect, increasing drug-related homicides by 1.296 
(Guadalupe et al. 2015). The emergence of federal operations as a possible causal link with the 
number of drug-related homicides was indicative of a continual struggle between the State and 
criminal non-state actors to surpass each other in response to their continual attempts to retain 
legitimate or illegitimate control of certain regions (Guadalupe et al. 2015). 
Based on the results of this model, the significance of the relationship between the 
independent variable of federal operations and the dependent variable (drug-related homicides) 
points towards the theory that as a response to the para militarization process that criminal 
organizations have undergone (Guadalupe et al. 2015). This phenomenon has brought with it a 
host of repressive and violent measures that compounded with the direct participation of federal 
forces in the conflict, has increased the levels of violence to previously unseen heights 
(Guadalupe et al. 2015) 
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This is important for a variety of reasons. Mummolo (2018) showed, using survey 
experiments, that show that citizens react negatively to the appearance of militarized police units 
in news reports and become less willing to fund police agencies and less supportive of having 
police patrols in their neighborhoods. He states that while “SWAT teams arguably remain a 
necessary tool for violent emergencies, restricting their use to those rare events may improve 
perceptions of police with little or no safety loss” (Mummolo 2018:4).  
“Given the concentration of deployments in communities of color, where trust in law 
enforcement and government at large was already depressed, the routine use of 
militarized police tactics by local agencies threatens to increase the historic tensions 
between marginalized groups and the state with no detectable public safety benefit” 
(Mummolo 2018:4). 
 This effect was demonstrated in the use of militarization in riots and protests, as well as 
border enforcement. Challenges to police militarization have come in the form of constitutional 
violations.  
Early literature indicates that the shift towards militarized policing stemmed from the 
concept of risk (Coyne and Hall, 2013). In the United States, the shift towards militarized police 
occurred with the developing war on drugs (Coyne and Hall 2013). Also, early literature focused 
primarily on the procurement of equipment and utilized the SWAT teams as examples of police 
militarization (Kraska 2007). 
Explorations of the process‐based model have since come to dominate research on police‐
community relations and perceptions of police (Moule et al. 2018). Recently the literature has 
focused on the linkages between procedural justice, legitimacy, compliance with the law, and 
cooperation with police (Moule 2018). Leading researcher Tom Tyler has focused on 
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establishing connections between procedural justice, legitimacy, and the rule of law (2003). His 
work has focused on addressing regulation and highlighting the effectiveness of communities’ 
cooperation in both enforcing laws and the creation of them (Tyler 2003). Less examined has 
been the relationship between legitimacy and public empowerment of police (Moule 2018). 
Some authors such as Moule, first examine the direct effect of legitimacy on public willingness 
to allow police to become more militarized to determine which two anticipated consequences of 
militarization, an increase in police effectiveness and possible harm to civil liberties, had the 
most impact (2018). Recently there has been a shift from cognitive psychology and rational 
choice theories, to the consideration of indirect paths between legitimacy and empowerment 
(Moule 2018). To highlight this, Moule used a national sample of over 700 American adults, and 
structural equation modeling and the results indicate legitimacy has both direct and indirect 
effects on police empowerment through militarization (2018). They then discuss implications for 
theory and policy and provide a counter-argument from other listed authors (Moule 2018).  
 In contrast, Vincenzo Bove of the University of Warwick, and Evelina Gavrilova of the 
Norwegian School of Economics attempted to find a causal relationship between military aid and 
crime rates (2017). They compared data on 176,000 transfers between 2006 and 2012 with crime 
and arrest rates in the regions that received the military equipment (Bove and Gavrilova 2018:8). 
They also looked for any differences between lethal and non-lethal equipment and examined the 
frequency of transfers to each police department (2018). To control for correlations between 
communities with high crime rates and police requests for military equipment, the authors 
tracked how much equipment was available each year and how much the military spent on 
equipment previously (Bove and Gavrilova 2018). They found that high military spending 
(during the war in Afghanistan) led to increased gear available to police departments (Bove and 
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Gavrilova 2018). Also, they found that military aid was associated with a fall in local citizens’ 
complaints about crime (Bove and Gavrilova 2018). Finally, the authors conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis that reasoned $5,800 worth of military gear can save society about $112,000 (Bove and 
Gavrilova 2018). As a result, military equipment was “a very inexpensive crime-reducing tool” 
when compared to the costs and benefits of hiring additional police officers (Bove and Gavrilova 
2018:2). Surprisingly, the study found that weapons did not have an observable effect on crime. 
Also, the authors recognized the fear that military equipment generates and encouraged future 
researchers to examine “the possibility that military equipment contributes to overly aggressive 
approaches by police” (Bove and Gavrilova 2018:8)  
In support of militarization and community policing, Matthew Harris, Jinseong Park, 
Donald Bruce, and Matthew Murray provide a local level empirical analysis of the causal effects 
of providing military equipment to local police (2017). Their study found similar conclusions to 
Bove and Gavrilova. By employing a “combination of publicly available country-year panel data 
matched to hand-collected data on citizen complaints, they investigated the effects of acquiring 
tactical weapons, optics, and vehicles on citizen complaints, assaults on police officers, and 
offender deaths” (Harris et al 2017:295). For causal identification, they exploited “exogenous 
variation in equipment availability and cost-shifting institutional aspects” of the 1033 Program 
(Harris 2017:295). Their results indicate that these items have generally positive effects: reduced 
citizen complaints, reduced assaults on officers, increased drug crime arrests, and no increases in 
offender deaths (Harris 2017). 
When looking through the deterrence lens, Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary argue that 
the key impediment to the accurate measurement of the effect of police on crime was “not 
necessarily simultaneity bias, but bias due to mismeasurement of police” (2013:1). Using a new 
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panel data set on crime in medium to large U.S. cities over 1960- 2010, they obtained 
“measurement error corrected estimates of the police elasticity of the cost-weighted sum of 
crimes of roughly -0.5” (Chalfin and McCrary 2013:1). The estimates confirm a controversial 
finding from the previous literature that police reduce violent crime more than property crime 
(Chalfin and McCrary 2013). The authors go on to discuss that one of the most “intuitive 
predictions of deterrence theory are that an increase in a typical offender’s chance of being 
caught decreases crime” (Chalfin and McCrary 2013:1). This prediction is a core part of 
Becker’s (1968) account of deterrence theory and is also present in historical articulations of 
deterrence theory, such as Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789). “The prediction was no less 
important in more recent treatments, such as the models discussed in Lochner (2004), Burdett, 
Lagos and Wright (2004), and Lee and McCrary (2009), among others” (Chalfin and McCrary 
2013:1). 
Vincenzo Bove and Evelina Gavrilova 
Bove and Gavrilova (2017) conducted the first empirical analysis of the consequences of 
the 1033 Program (National Defense Authorization Act). Overall, their research attempted to 
answer the question of whether the federal 1033 program was successful in its intent and their 
focus was on whether surplus military-grade equipment acquired by local police departments 
affects crime rates. They start by investigating the causal effect of an increase in the 
militarization of US local police forces on their effectiveness in preventing and solving crime. 
One of the strengths of this source was that it explains the 1033 program, shows the result of the 
1033 program on arrest rates, and provides the requirements of the 1033 program. This source 
connects to the micro example of political protest response in advantaged and disadvantaged 
communities by highlighting how “Ferguson’s police force used military-grade weapons and 
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armored tactical vehicles—believed to be acquired through the “1033 Program”—to quell the 
riots (Bove and Gavrilova 2017:9). The perceived disproportionality of the reaction of law 
enforcement has sparked a contentious debate about the consequences of giving military 
capabilities to local police forces” (Bove and Gavrilova 2017:3).  
Methods. 
 To determine the left and right limits of their research, they utilize temporal variations in 
US military expenditure and between-counties variation in the odds of receiving a positive 
amount of military aid to identify the causal effect of militarized policing on crime drawing most 
of the research from the Department of Defense. To do this, they used open-source data from the 
US Department of Defense concerning approximately 176,000 transfers of equipment by 8,000 
local police agencies over the period 2006–2012 (Bove and Gavrilova 2017:9). They looked at 
whether this military-grade equipment had a tangible effect on law enforcement, measured by 
crime and arrest rates. By using these two variables, they were able to remove the deterrence 
effect produced by the display of military equipment from the efficiency effect of when the 
police use military equipment to solve more crime and arrest perpetrators. To identify the causal 
effect of militarized policing on crime, they looked at the time variation induced by military 
spending and local variation between counties in the likelihood of being an aid recipient.  
Results. 
What they found was that military aid reduces crime rates. More military aid leads to a 
decline in robberies, assaults, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts. Based on their study, Bove and 
Gavrilova (2017) claim that “a 10 percent increase in aid reduces total crime by 5.9 crimes per 
100,000 population” (8). “Although the magnitude of this effect was relatively small, 0.24 
percent of the average crime rates in treated areas (2,470 crimes), the annual average value of aid 
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acquired by a county was around $58,000, suggesting that this was a very inexpensive crime-
reducing tool” (Bove and Gavrilova 2017:9). To support their study, they highlight that their 
results partially mirror those of Harris, Park, Bruce, and Murray (2016), who also found that 
receiving tactical items leads to a reduction in property crime rates (Bove and Gavrilova 2017). 
This lays the foundation of the use of militarization against disadvantaged communities by 
showing the mindset and goals of the agencies that utilize the cost-saving, crime-reducing tool of 
the 1033 program against disadvantaged communities. This was due to the highlights of (i) 
military aid reduces street-level crime; (ii) the program was cost-effective; and (iii) there was 
evidence in favor of a deterrence mechanism which was the goal of maintaining peace in riots 
and political protests (Bove and Gavrilova 2017:9).  
Daryl Meeks 
 Meeks (2006) provides a contrasting viewpoint to Bove and Gavrilova (2017). Using 
different metrics, Meeks (2006) makes the claims that militarization harms inner-city 
communities. This becomes relevant as current research builds on the data provided before 2012. 
Meeks (2006) argues that the inner-city urban underclass has become socially and economically 
encapsulated by the urban war on crime and an increasingly militarized urban policing force 
waging that war. As a result, he states that the inner-city community has also become both 
enemy and victim in an obscure economic and social war that was sanctioned by federal, state, 
and local governments. This connects to the micro-level issue of political protest responses by 
showing the shift of policing in disadvantaged populations in response to crime by law 
enforcement and supports the idea that disadvantaged communities are policed differently than 




 Meeks (2006) utilizes a content analysis approach of works by both criminologists and 
social scientists in his research and he attempts to answer the question of whether this was a war 
against crime or a war against the urban underclass. His intent was “to contribute to the 
understanding of the potential economic and social consequences of the war on crime and the 
urban underclass” (Meeks 2006:36). To do this, he examines the context of police militarization 
and its negative impact on the urban underclass.  
Results. 
Meek's (2006) research primarily focuses on the FBI Annual Crime Reports, Census data, 
and the United States Justice Departments' data to validate his hypothesis. He finds that, based 
on 2003 Census Bureau data, the poverty rate in 2003 “increased from 12.1 percent in 2002 to 
12.5 percent” (Meeks 2006:40). This resulted in “35.9 million people living under the sub-
standard conditions, an increase of 1.3 million people from 2002” (Meeks 2006:40). One of the 
most important finds was that the poverty rates remained unchanged for urban Hispanics and 
blacks. This was important when establishing what an advantaged community was versus a 
disadvantaged community.  
Meeks (2006) also takes the time to suggest reforms. He highlights how to correct his 
findings by incorporating other disciplines into the discussion. He states that “Collaboration with 
other disciplines was needed to foster a greater understanding of the collateral damage effects of 
a militarized urban war on crime and its impact on the urban underclass” (Meeks 2006:40). His 
argument goes on to say that such collaborative efforts should lead to renewed urban policies 
that take into consideration the "oppositional" culture that has developed and which influences 




It is important to remember that the militarization of the police is a major criminal justice 
topic, but its recent visibility is an ongoing part of the original reform ideal. This is crucial in 
understanding reform and how to apply it to communities. Leichtman (2008) provides historical 
context to the interpretation of data that is occurring today. To determine whether militarization 
affects one community more than another, the basis of the construction of the reform must be 
examined. Leichtman (2008) discusses the importance of the military model throughout police 
reform, and how it has coexisted with, rather than been supplanted by, the professional model. In 
essence, early reformers chose the military upon which to structure their concept of the urban 
police. That concept was refashioned into the professional model as the background of the 
reformers changed. This new model then replaced the military model in criminal justice 
literature, public vernacular, and police self-image, although the military model continued to 
exist under the radar. This research connects to the micro-level example by explaining the 
historical context of the heavy militarization of disadvantaged communities. 
Methods. 
Leichtman (2008) conducts a content analysis to examine the basis of militarization and 
how it was applied differently, to different communities. Leichtman does this by breaking down 
the concept into four sections: The police paradigm and the similarities and differences in the 
two models, the study of urban areas and reform, the literature and historical studies, and 
scholarly interpretations of the two policing models. Most of the data analyzed by the author are 




Leichtman (2008) found that community policing has been replaced with the military 
model and that some criminals, depending upon their crime, are now being equated to terrorists. 
Also, even in departments that proscribe to a community policing approach (often in advantaged 
communities), many officers do not buy into the idea. Rather they see themselves as a last line of 
defense. Leichtman (2008) claims that “Until there was a change in the orientation of most police 
officers, that their values are not the only American values, that diversity was not anti-American, 
and that they are connected to the many and varied communities that make up the United States, 
the military model was likely to live on in ever-changing forms” (70). 
Jeremy Kuzmarov 
 Kuzmarov (2009) seeks to analyze the implementation of and paradoxes surrounding the 
police training programs, demonstrating how they were conceived as mechanisms for advancing 
American strategic interests and why they resulted in the spread of political repression and 
violence. With remarkable continuity, police aid is used not just to target criminals but to 
develop elaborate intelligence networks oriented towards internal defense, which allowed the 
suppression of dissident groups to take place on a wider scale. Kuzmarov (2009) also states that 
the programs further helped to militarize the police and provided them with a new‐found 
perception of power, while “schooling them in a hardline stance that fostered the dehumanization 
of political adversaries and bred suspicion about grass‐roots mobilization” (Kuzmarov 2009:4). 
Kuzmarov (2009) argues that militarization is institutionalized within the fabric of American 
policy and its coercive underpinnings. Kuzmarov (2009) claims that police training programs are 
central to both modernization and nation-building. They serve key political and ideological 
functions in providing the internal security and order deemed necessary for the implementation 
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of development programs and they are crucial in upgrading the surveillance capacity of 
developing world states, thus allowing for a more extensive carrying out of social control—the 
ultimate marker of modernity in the post-enlightenment era. This connects to the micro-level 
issue of disadvantaged communities by showing the mindset of how policymakers think 
militarization was key to progressing forward and as a result, communities deemed to require 
reform are more militarized. 
Methods. 
Kuzmarov (2009) incorporates historical data, history, and current data in content 
analysis to display what he considers the full picture. He attempts to understand the who, what, 
when, where, and why of the intent of repression on certain groups. Kuzmarov (2009) utilized 
both sources within the United States and sources internationally to demonstrate that the issue of 
force being unequally applied to disadvantaged communities was international and not just an 
American issue.  
Results. 
 Supporting the theory that police use more (discriminatory) force against communities of 
disadvantaged individuals, Kuzmarov (2009) found that this issue was worldwide and seen as 
part of a fundamental issue in many countries. This highlights how the issue in the United States 
was part of a much larger aspect of discrimination. 
David Fasenfest 
 Fasenfest (2015) states that the “evidence of a society, in which the forces of social 
control manage through the general population’s acceptance of the legitimacy of that rule, was 
the absence of a police presence to enforce ideological domination” (4). Fasenfest (2015) 
explains that the less often one experiences the police daily, the more they can argue that people 
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have accommodated to the social, political, and economic structure of society. This was 
important because it highlights the difference in the perception of suburban and inner-city 
environments. Fasenfest (2015) then argues that it stands to reason that a major presence of 
institutions of control in their many forms (whether local constabulary, regional authorities, 
national police, and military units) will reflect a society in stress, a society which increasingly 
shows signs of a loss of legitimacy or support for ruling elites and structures. This connects to 
the micro-level issue of policing in advantaged communities versus disadvantaged communities 
by providing insight into how people who live in advantaged communities believe that 
disadvantaged communities are policed according to need versus discrimination. 
Methods. 
 Fasenfest (2015) research highlights examples such as “the increasing need for both civil 
and secret police authorities to impose order in what has been called repressive regimes to the 
presence of military rule by juntas or ‘elected’ generals, all used to quell dissent or crush 
opposition while maintaining a ruling elite. To support his claim, Fasenfest (2015) conduct a 
content analysis on eight sources and found a positive correlation with each one. Also, he 
conducted external interviews to get firsthand information concerning perspectives of law 
enforcement and communities. 
Results. 
 Fasenfest (2015) found that capitalist societies are beginning to experience social protest 
and fundamental social changes. He claims that  
“As these efforts increase in intensity – whether workers are more often, and more 
violently, protesting against austerity throughout Europe, or minority communities in the 
US are rising in anger over the increasing violence perpetrated by the police against 
27 
 
people of color and non-European ethnicity – we are witnessing an increasing 
militarization and in some spheres a para-militarization of the enforcement of capitalist 
social relations” (6)  
Fasenfest (2015) states that as protests continue, both advantaged and disadvantaged 
communities will question the use of militarization and this was important because 
understanding what militarization was intended for helps understand the effects it has had. 
Daniel D'Amico 
D'Amico uses trends in the history of social science dedicated to the study of crime and 
punishment and presents it as a case study supporting theory of social change. D'Amico (2017) 
argues that designing effective social institutions and public policies first requires an accurate 
vision of how society operates. D'Amico (2017) then claims that an accurate model of society 
further requires scientific methods suited for the study of human beings as purposeful agents and 
the study of human institutions as complex social phenomena. Aiming to replicate the objectivity 
of physical sciences using formal modeling and statistical measurement, D'Amico (2017) 
showcases how economists throughout the 20th century imposed an excessively technical vision 
of human decision-making. D'Amico (2017) then claims that policy failures and social problems 
resulted. This paper argues that the historical trends of applied social science dedicated to crime 
and punishment can be understood similarly. Formal modeling and statistical measurement 
continuously displaced methods more attuned to human intentionality and social complexity. As 
result, amidst a long-run history of intellectual and political change, US law enforcement and 
criminal punishment policies became technocratic, and outcomes became disjointed from their 
stated intentions to promote social order and welfare. In other words, militarization moved on 
from its intended purpose and turned into a method to control inner-city areas. This research 
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allows provides a racial viewpoint on the effectiveness of the law as a basis for understanding 
and connects to the micro example by discussing the militarization of protests and disadvantaged 
communities. 
Methods. 
D'Amico (2017) analyses data from the U.S. prison system to discern the 
disproportionate application of militarization. discusses the Posse Comitatus Act, racial history, 
race protections, causes for civil unrest, police militarization and its effect on race, and efforts to 
change the law.  
Results. 
He found that a strong interrelationship can be discerned between the methodological 
trends of social science dedicated to crime and punishment on the one hand, with real policy 
trends and social outcomes on the other. This supports the idea of the haves versus the have nots 
by showing there was historical discrimination in the choice of study of social issues. 
Fanna Gamal 
 Gamal analyzed and critiqued police militarization in regards to race. The author 
intended to initiate a discussion on police militarization in regards to race. As a result, they 
examine police militarization as the result of political decisions that many believed often traded 
on racial fear and anxiety. It begins in the Reconstruction Era and continues through racial 
uprisings in the 1960s, the War on Drugs, and present movements for police accountability and 
racial justice. The focus was on the Posse Comitatus Act and the author argues that police 
militarization is, and has always been, a deeply racialized issue. Specifically, they claim that the 
trend of police militarization can be viewed as a race-making process in that “patterns of police 
militarization have constructed and reinforced race and racial hierarchies in America” (Gamal 
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2016:980). They go on to discuss the racial politics of protection and the reference to a process 
of police militarization that allows the State to construct race by selectively assembling two 
groupings—those who will be marginalized through heightened surveillance and control and 
those who will be advantaged by their access to state protection. The strength of this essay lies in 
its ability to showcase incidents over a wide time frame and illustrate how the laws created the 
conditions for police militarization and then supported its practices. Ultimately, the author 
stresses a more nuanced conversation about the critical intersections of race, militarization, and 
policing.  
Richard Moule, George Burruss, Megan Parry, and Brianna Fox 
Moule, Burruss, Parry, and Fox (2018) claim that the process‐based model dominates 
contemporary American research on police‐community relations and perceptions of police. He 
discusses, in his note, how literature has examined the linkages between procedural justice, 
legitimacy, compliance with the law, and cooperation with the police. He claims that the 
relationship between legitimacy and public empowerment of police was poorly researched. To 
correct this Moule (2018) examines this relationship, focusing on police militarization. He first 
looks at the direct effect of legitimacy on public willingness to allow police to become more 
militarized. Drawing from cognitive psychology and rational choice theories, he then considers 
indirect paths between legitimacy and empowerment, concentrating on two anticipated 
consequences of militarization—an increase in police effectiveness and possible harm to civil 
liberties. Using a national sample of over 700 American adults, and structural equation modeling, 
he develops results that indicate legitimacy has both direct and indirect effects on police 
empowerment, in part by shaping assessments of the possible consequences of empowerment.  
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Law Enforcement Militarization Through Legislation 
 Legislation has played an important role in militarization of law enforcement and the 
militarization of the southern border and understanding the intent of enacted legislation provides 
a historical timeline for both the United States and Mexico. In the 1950’s, the United States 
began seeing an influx of drugs from Columbia (Ramirez 1999). Originally, Pablo Escobar and 
the Medellín Cartel (Reuter and Ronfeldt 1992) were bringing the drugs. Early legislation was 
focused on the “war on drugs” and due to increasing police pressure, the Medellín cartel began 
utilizing avenues through Mexico to move product across the border (Trostle 1990; Reuter and 
Ronfeldt 1992). Through the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968, the Bureau 
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was created to combat the growing drug use within the 
United States (Reuter and Ronfeldt 1992). In addition, this act created the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration which ultimately expanded SWAT to other cities (Kraska 2007).  
In 1971, President Nixon declared a “war on drugs” and legislation combating drug use 
and import increased (Ramsey 1997). Nixon’s focus on combating drugs within the United States 
led to legislation such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act that 
consolidated previous drug laws and strengthened law enforcement by allowing police to 
conduct “no-knock” searches (Ramsey 1997). Additional legislation saw the creation of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) (1973) and enhancements to the DEA’s power by allowing 
them to extradite foreign drug traffickers and prosecute them in the United States through the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Ramsey 1997). 
 Militarization of law enforcement saw another increase in authority in 1981 with the 
Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act (Ramsey 1997). This act 
allowed the military to cooperate with both domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies 
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(Rosenthal 1999). Some authorized operations were assistance in counter-drug operations, 
assistance for civil disturbances, special security operations, counter-terrorism, explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD), and similar activities (Kraska 2007). This power however, was not 
without checks and balances and as a result, constitutional and statutory restrictions along with 
corresponding directives and regulations limited the type of support provided (Rosenthal 1999). 
Ultimately, this act allowed and continues to allow the military to allow access to military bases 
and military equipment.  
The general trend towards the militarization of police continued in the ’90s and begin 
moving towards the militarization of the border with the National Defense Authorization Act of 
1990 and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) in 1994 (Seelke and 
Finklea 2010; Seelke 2011). The VCCLEA allowed bypassing of deportation proceedings for 
aggravated felons, enhanced penalties for smuggling and reentry after deportation, and increased 
appropriations for the Border Patrol (Seelke 2011). The early ’90s also saw the growing 
cooperation between federal agencies and local law enforcement and the Law Enforcement 
Support Office (1995) creation within the DEA to exclusively work with Law Enforcement 
(Seelke 2011). 
Although legislation played a significant role in law enforcement militarization through 
response and prevention, the pace of militarization in law enforcement was also affected by 
events (Turner and Fox 2019). In 1997, the North Hollywood shootout highlighted the 
discrepancies in issued equipment (Zambri and Sutliff 2014; Lawson 2019). Officers were 
typically armed with 9mm or .38 Special pistols, with some having access to a 12-gauge shotgun 
housed in their cars (Lawson 2019). In contrast, The North Hollywood bank robbers carried fully 
automatic AK-47 weapons with high-capacity drum magazines and ammunition capable of 
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penetrating vehicles and tactical vests (Lawson 2019). With these weapons, two bank robbers 
fired approximately “1,100 rounds” at officers and civilians before being neutralized (Lawson 
2019). After reviews noted that department issued service pistols had insufficient range and 
relatively poor accuracy and the arrival of the SWAT and their increased firepower allowed for 
the end of the event (Lawson 2019). This led to SWAT being utilized outside of their original 
role due to their exclusive training, increased firepower, and availability. 
There was a slight lull in legislation addressing the militarization of law enforcement 
from 2000 to approximately 2006. During this time, focus was placed on securing borders and 
global threats (Urban 2008). Border militarization saw an increase in use and applicability. 
However, in 2007, Section 287(g) of the 1996 IIRIRA was implemented (Urban 2008). This 
allowed for the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement 
agencies (Urban 2008). These agreements could range from training designated state and local 
officers to perform selected functions of immigration officers (Urban 2008). Agencies were also 
authorized to search certain federal databases and conduct interviews to assist in the 
identification of individuals in the country illegally, overseen by ICE (Urban 2008). The first 
agreement was signed in 2002 but most of the state and local law enforcement agencies that 
joined the program did so after 2007 (Urban 2008). 
Most militarization legislation had funding attached to it. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $40 million to state and local law enforcement agencies 
(Gunderson, et al 2019). This money was primarily intended for grants and equipment to local 
law enforcement along the southern border (Gunderson 2019). Specifically, in large drug 
trafficking areas to narcotics activity stemming from the southern border (Gunderson 2019).  
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The climax of militarization of law enforcement seemed to occur in 2014 with the killing 
of Michael Brown in Ferguson Missouri. The resulting riots saw local law enforcement, along 
with a National Guard presence utilized armored vehicles and military-type equipment to control 
and intimate the crowds (Kiker 2014). This event started a nationwide discussion on the need for 
militarization within law enforcement. In 2019, similar events occurred in Minneapolis 
Minnesota with the killing of George Floyd, and highlighted the use of militarization of law 
enforcement within advantaged and disadvantaged communities (Kraska 2020).  
Federal 1033 Program 
So how did law enforcement come to acquire military-style gear and tactics? Federal 
programs, such as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 1033 program, made military-grade 
equipment available to local law enforcement starting in 1997 (The Constitution Project 2015). 
The basis for this transfer was established in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
years 1990 and 1991 (DLA 2020). In this act, Congress authorized the transfer of excess DoD 
property to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Congress later passed the NDAA 
for the fiscal year 1997, which allowed law enforcement agencies to acquire property for genuine 
law enforcement purposes, particularly counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities (DLA 
2020). 
In 1997, the Department of Defense 1033 Program, enacted by Congress with the passage 
of the Defense Authorization Act, allowed all law enforcement agencies to obtain surplus 
equipment from the federal government for use in legitimate police activities. Earlier 
authorizations allowed the transfer of equipment to law enforcement agencies involved in the 
War on Drugs. (Harris 2017).  This allowed police departments with smaller budgets to obtain 
equipment that was no longer needed from the federal government, thereby allotting the surplus 
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to other areas such as training or community outreach programs (Harris 2017). After 9/11, this 
program took the forefront as the DOD upgraded equipment for the wars fought overseas (Harris 
2017).  
As of June 2020, there were around “8,200 federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies from 49 states and four U.S. territories participating in the program” (DLA 2020). In 
2013, according to the Defense Logistics Agency, the 1033 program gave “$450 million worth of 
equipment to local law enforcement” (The Constitution Project 2015:2). In particular, the state of 
Arizona has received “29 armored personnel carriers, 9 military helicopters, nearly 800 M-16 
automatic rifles, more than 400 bayonets, and more than 700 pairs of night-vision goggles” (The 
Constitution Project 2015:2). Unfortunately, federal government and most states and local 
governments have failed to exercise a large degree of oversight of either the acquisition of 
military materials or their deployment (Kraska 2007) (The Constitution Project 2015). As of 
2020, DLA used three primary ways to maintain and ensure compliance with all program 
requirements and property accountability (DLA 2020). These methods were annual inventories, 
program compliance reviews (PCR), and state coordinator reviews (DLA 2020). To assist in 
these minimal oversights, a few states have begun to enforce oversight and standards of their 
own but these standards are not universal and often are complicated to enforce (The Constitution 
Project 2015). 
Research has found that despite the stated purpose of programs like the 1033 program or 
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) grant program to protect against terrorism and 
similar threats, the equipment and money coming through these programs are far more often 
used for routine community police work, such as serving search warrants or policing protests 
(The Constitution Project 2015). The researchers took this idea and Bove and Gavrilova 
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attempted to determine whether the federal 1033 program was successful in its implementation 
(2017;2019). To do this, Bove and Gavrilova (original research) investigated whether surplus 
military-grade equipment acquired by local police departments affected crime rates (2017). They 
started by investigating the causal effect of an increase in the militarization of local police forces 
on their effectiveness in preventing and solving crime (Bove and Gavrilova 2017). Their research 
was considered the first empirical analysis of the consequences of the 1033 Program (National 
Defense Authorization Act) (Bove and Gavrilova 2017). To determine the left and right limits of 
their research, they utilized temporal variations in military expenditure and between-counties 
variations in the odds of receiving a positive amount of military aid to identify the causal effect 
of militarized policing on crime (Bove and Gavrilova 2017). Most of the research was drawn 
from the Department of Defense. Ultimately, they found that (1) military aid reduces street-level 
crime; (2) the program was cost-effective; and (3) there was evidence in favor of a deterrence 
mechanism (Bove and Gavrilova 2017).  
Recent activity of the 1033 program saw President Barack Obama limit the 1033 program 
in 2015 and a request for an examination into the practice (Radil et al 2017). However, in 2016, 
the Obama Administration announced that it would revisit the 2015 ban on some types of 
military equipment for police forces, and began a process of case-by-case review due to public 
pressure (Radil et al 2017). President Donald Trump rolls back restrictions on the program in 
2017 and the Law of Internal Security was passed (Dansby 2020). 
Border Militarization 
Early History 
As mentioned in the previous sections, militarization was not confined to domestic 
enforcement. The inception of SWAT, combined with legislative measures, saw the 
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militarization of the southern United States Border through the increasing use of agents and 
National Guard to prevent unauthorized movement across the border (Govern 2016). Primarily, it 
was the action of moving from a SWAT and hostage-based intention to a proactive-based 
program, that generated international impacts (Govern 2016). The largest impact was along the 
southern United States border in the way that the Mexican crime syndicates adapted to 
militarization from both Mexico and the United States.  
At its inception, the Customs Service (border patrol) operated as a site of cross-border 
cooperation and negotiations until after WWI (Hernandez 2010). They worked closely with the 
areas they patrolled and formed the basis for community policing practices (Dunn 1999). The 
New Deal in 1933 saw Congress begin moving away from utilizing local law enforcement by 
strengthening federal criminal control agencies and expanding federal crime control powers 
(Hernandez 2010). During the first decades of establishment, the border patrol was a small outfit 
working on the edge of law enforcement and criminal justice in the US. Mandates came from 
Washington but practices and policies were local creations (Hernandez, 2010). 
Following WWII, federal initiatives, resources, and directives, altered the landscape of 
law enforcement in the United States (Hernandez 2010). During this time, the border patrol 
benefited from the new investments in federal law enforcement as increased funding, payroll 
expansion, improved technologies, and immigration controls (Hernandez 2010). Over the second 
half of the twentieth century, the budgets would expand and then contract but the organization 
never returned to its primary roots (Hernandez 2010). 
Secondary Impacts 
Border militarization has been linked to the phenomenon of war (Guadalupe et al. 2015). 
War is a phenomenon that is inherently linked to an acknowledgment of an enemy who has been 
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declared to be hostile (Guadalupe et al. 2015). This has a direct impact on communities and the 
ability of crime syndicates to exploit them, especially those seeking to immigrate to the United 
States. However, when looking at border militarization, studies have found that there was “little 
evidence that more border militarization will stop desperate people from making desperate 
journeys” (Michalowski 2020).  
Later History 
With U.S. concerns over unauthorized immigration on the rise, and with the cooperation 
of the Mexican government, the Clinton administration began to focus to the border. The turning 
point of full-scale border militarization started with the National Defense Authorization Act of 
1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, and the construction of a 13-mile 
border wall between San Diego and Tijuana (VCCLEA) in 1994 (Ramsey 1997).  
Legislatively, the 1994 NAFTA opened the door to new institutional relationships 
between the United States and Mexico on issues including military training, environmental 
degradation at the border, central bank cooperation, and rule of law (Ramsey 1997). This 
coincided with a multi‐year border enforcement strategy that Timothy Dunn labeled “the 
militarization of the border” (1996) (Rosa 2016). It was an infusion of military tactics, 
equipment, and strategy into law enforcement, particularly the Border Patrol, in the border region 
and the use of actual armed forces.  
The same year that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
implemented in Mexico the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) inaugurated several 
new campaigns of militarized policing at the border (Rosa 2016). In the El Paso area, Operation 
“Blockade” later re‐named to “Hold‐the Line,” commenced in September (Rosa 2016). Four 
hundred Border Patrol agents and their vehicles were positioned along a twenty‐mile stretch of 
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the border and helicopters went up in a show of force (Rosa 2016). Shortly thereafter, the INS 
modeled southern California's “Operation Gatekeeper,” south Texas’s “Operation Lower Rio 
Grande,” and southern Arizona's “Operation Safeguard,” on “Operation Hold‐the‐Line” (Rosa 
2016). This augmented border enforcement had a limited effect and the border only became 
more difficult for crime syndicates to penetrate but not impossible (Villa 2015; Wilson 2018). 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, border security became a talking point and 
the United States begin expanding the Border Patrol (Wilson 2018). In 2003, the Department of 
Homeland Security was created (Wilson 2018). At that time, nearly all the functions of INS, the 
DOJ agency responsible for immigration services, border enforcement, and border inspection, 
were transferred to DHS and restructured to become three new agencies: Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and USCIS (Broderick 2019). 
Also, US-VISIT became a separate, new entity in DHS (Broderick 2019).  
On March 1, 2003, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection became the nation’s first 
comprehensive border security agency with a focus on maintaining the nation’s boundaries and 
ports of entry (US Border Patrol 2020). Before this, the U.S. Customs Service, which “traced its 
original functions to July 31, 1789, was responsible for the border integrity” (US Border Patrol 
2020). The Customs Service closed with the birth of Customs and Border Protection, but its 
leaders transferred to Customs and Border Protection as well as the majority of its staff 
(Department of Homeland Security 2020). 
In 2004, Congress authorized hiring an additional ten thousand Border Patrol agents, to 
double the force to twenty-one thousand agents by 2010. In the same year, the Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms (ATF) determined that the Mexican cartels had become the leading gun trafficking 
organizations operating in the southwest U.S. (BBC 2019). To combat this, the eTrace firearm 
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tracing software system was implemented. eTrace provided access to the ATF's Firearms Tracing 
System which allowed law enforcement to trace firearms encountered in connection with a 
criminal investigation to the first recorded purchaser (US Border Patrol 2020). As part of eTrace 
expansion, the ATF agreed to provide training to Mexican and Central American countries (US 
Border Patrol 2020).  
To assist with border security, 2005 saw the launching of The Secure Border Initiative 
(Mohr 2008; Michalowski 2015). It included SBInet, which was intended to create a “virtual 
border” by helping the Border Patrol target enforcement efforts through a network of cameras 
and sensors to assist in identifying unauthorized border crossings (Michalowski 2015). This 
system was abandoned in 2010 due to a cost vs benefit analysis (Michalowski 2015). 
 In addition to the electronic monitoring, 2005 saw an increase in operations conducted on 
the border. Operation Streamline was conducted in the Del Rio Sector of the border in Texas and 
later expanded to other areas (Reid 2009). Its goal was a “zero tolerance” policy against all 
persons apprehended for entering the country without authorization (Reid 2009). In the United 
States, local civilians, self-labeled, “the Minutemen” began patrolling the border (Reid 2009). 
They reported any unauthorized border crossings or other illegal activity to the U.S. Border 
Patrol. 
Even with the electronic monitoring, 2006 saw President Bush signs the Secure Fences 
Act, promising 700 miles of fencing on the border, plus a virtual wall across the entire 2,000-
mile border (Michalowski 2015). In May 2006, over 6,000 National Guard personnel were 
authorized to be sent to the border to assist in appending unauthorized persons (Congressional 
Research Service 2019). Another 5,500 plus National Guard troops were deployed to the border 
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in a campaign called “Operation Jump Start” shortly thereafter (Congressional Research Service 
2019).  
In 2007, The U.S. and Mexico jointly announce the Merida Initiative (a.k.a. Plan 
México), a multi-year security cooperation agreement through which the U.S. government 
provided financial assistance, equipment, training, and intelligence to Mexico and Central 
American countries to help them fight drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and 
money laundering. In 2010, DHS announced that the Secure Communities Program had been 
deployed to all 25 U.S. counties along the Southwest border (Congressional Research 2019). The 
goal was to expand the program to every law enforcement jurisdiction in the country by 2013.  
Following this, there was a period where there was no new federal immigration policy 
put into place (Coronado and Alejo 2014). To combat this, states began to enact their own. In 
April 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signs the broadest and toughest anti-illegal immigrant 
law in U.S. history (Coronado 2014). The legislation, SB-1070, cracks down on anyone 
harboring or hiring undocumented immigrants and gives local police unprecedented powers 
(Coronado 2014). 
The Department of Homeland Security completed 649 miles of barriers in 2011, at an 
estimated $6.5 million per mile, and 299 miles of vehicle barriers that cost approximately $1.7 
million per mile (Rosen and Kassab 2019). However, on review, the $1 billion spent on a pilot 
program for “virtual surveillance” in Arizona yielded only 53 miles of coverage (Rosen and 
Kassab 2019). With the backing of the DHS, the Obama administration cut funding for the rest 
of the hyper-expensive “virtual wall.” (Rosen and Kassab 2019). 
In 2013, The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act (S744) (2013) passed the US Senate (Rosen and Kassab 2019). Under the provision referred 
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to as the “border surge” the bill provided $40 billion for “all-out militarization” of the border 
(Rosen and Kassab 2019). $20 billion was intended for wall construction. However, this bill 
never passed the House of Representatives. 
In 2014, Secure Communities was replaced with the Priority Enforcement Program. In 
2018, President Donald Trump ordered Operation Guardian Support and Operation Faithful 
Patriot to provide U.S. military assistance to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in 
the southwest United States (Rosen and Kassab 2019). The 2018 federal budget provided $1.6 
billion for border barrier enhancement and construction, along with an increase in border 
militarization (Beittel 2019). This funding was used to begin the first major border wall 
construction under the Trump administration. To further obtain the funds needed, the 2019 
federal budget provided $1.3 billion in funding for border wall construction (Beittel 2019). 
Mexico’s Militarization  
In 2016, six million people lived near the US‐Mexico border alone, while urban centers 
along the east and west coasts of the United States represented the largest population corridors in 
the United States (Rosa 2016). Militarizing one side of a border saw consequences on the other 
side (CITE). To help assist the United States and begin to gain both legitimacy and control 
within their borders, Mexico declared a war on drugs in 2006 (Bunker 2013a). 
Prior to 2006, Mexico utilized militarization means earlier than the United States (Brophy 
2008). During the years of 1986-1994, Mexico reduced trade barriers and announced entrance  
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into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Two years later, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the PRI candidate, was elected 
president on a reform platform (ANUNCIO 2006) (SDP Noticias). Salinas pushed to deregulate 
the economy, which paved the way for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
(Grayson 2013a). In his final year in office, Salinas’s administration was hampered by corruption 
charges related to drug trafficking. This theme of corruption would be repeated many times, at 
all levels of government (Yáñez and Arturo 2009). 
In 1994, the PRI’s Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon was elected president and was 
challenged by a banking crisis when the value of the Mexican peso plunged in international 
markets. To assist, President Clinton sought congressional approval of the Mexican Stabilization 
Act. Failing to get this passed, he obtains a $20 billion loan from the Treasury Department to 
help Mexico stabilize its currency. Meanwhile, an armed revolutionary group called the Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation, or EZLN, declares war on the Mexican government (Bailey 2014).  
The Federal Preventive Police by the merger of four federal organizations to coordinate 
the fight against the growing threat of drug cartels occurred in 1998 and 1999 (Bailey 2014). 
This was like the merging under the DHS that the United States saw after 9/11. The agency 




unit called the Investigation and National Security Center. To fill the ranks, military personnel 
transferred from the Mexican Army's 3rd Military Police Brigade (Bailey 2014). 
In 2000, the PRI's presidential monopoly ended with the election of Vicente Fox, a 
member of the opposition Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN). Fox tokk office vowing to 
improve trade relations with the United States, reduce corruption and drug trafficking, and 
improve the status of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. President George W. 
Bush takes office in the United States and says that Mexico was the country’s most important 
foreign policy priority. However, U.S. attention toward Mexico wanes after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks (Bailey 2014). 
The National Center for Information, Analysis, and Planning to Fight Crime (CENAPI) 
was established in 2003 and Guzman sends well-armed enforcers to border cities south of Texas 
to take over Gulf cartel smuggling routes in 2004. In 2005 Guzman sought to gain control of the 
border city of Tijuana and trafficking routes into California. Violence escalates across Mexico 
and about 1,500 people are killed over the year (Bailey 2014). 
As a result of the spreading violence, Felipe Calderon was elected as President in 2006 
(Grayson 2013a). In October of the same year, President Bush signed legislation to build seven 
hundred miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border. When Calderón assumed the 
presidency, he stated that he “could not rely on the federal police nor the intelligence agencies to 
restore order and crack down the logistics of the mafias” (Colbert 2015). Over several decades, 
the cartels had bribed police commanders and top politicians and state authorities would not only 
fail to cooperate with other authorities at distinct federal levels but would actively protect the 
cartels and their leaders (Grayson 2014a). With limited options available, Calderón turned to the 
Mexican Armed Forces, which, because of its limited involvement in acting against the cartels, 
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remained relatively immune to corruption and organized crime infiltration (Grayson 2014a). 
Calderón then moved the military to parts of Mexico most plagued by drug-violence to target, 
capture, and kill the leaders of the drug trafficking organizations (Grayson 2014a). Yet, the 
president believed that the military could not fight the cartels alone and he needed law 
enforcement to rely on for patrolling, collecting intelligence information, and gathering pieces of 
evidence necessary to prosecute drug traffickers (Grayson 2014a). 
To disrupt and destroy the critical nodes of drug trafficking, Felipe Calderon instituted a 
major counternarcotic campaign against Mexican cartels in 2006 (Staff 2007). At its height, the 
strategy involved the deployment of 96,000 combat troops, nearly 40% of all active personnel, to 
directly confront syndicates and their leaders (Staff 2007). The United States actively supported 
the crackdown, pledging $1.4 billion of counternarcotic assistance for fiscal years 2008 and 2010 
in what subsequently became known as the Merida Initiative (Jarosz 2012). U.S. support 
continued under the Barack Obama administration, although at a somewhat lower level ($660 
million between 2011 and 2012). 
With the government's principal goal being the reduction of drug-related violence. The 
Mexican military began to focus on dismantling the powerful drug cartels, and on preventing 
drug trafficking across the border (Andrews 2014). To do this, Calderón dispatched 6,500 
Mexican Army soldiers to Michoacán (Operation Michoacán) to end drug violence there (Grillo 
2006; Andrews 2014). This action is regarded as the first major retaliation made against the 
cartel violence and is generally viewed as the starting point of the Mexican drug war between the 
government and the drug cartels (Grillo 2006).  
The government was relatively successful in detaining drug lords but it came at a cost. 
Drug-related violence spiked high in the contested area along the U.S. border such as Ciudad 
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Juárez and Tijuana (Andrews 2014). Some analysts, like U.S. Ambassador in Mexico Carlos 
Pascual, argued that this rise in violence was a direct result of Felipe Calderón's military 
measures (Grayson 2014a).  
Although Calderon’s policy was instrumental in eliminating several key drug lords as 
well as making record cocaine seizures, it had the unintended effect of unleashing a highly brutal 
war in the northern provinces (Grayson 2014). Over six years, at least 40,000 and possibly as 
many as 60,000 people are thought to have died in drug-related fighting as increasingly 
fragmented cartels moved to engage each other and the authorities in a battle over territory and 
sales. Those targeted included members of competing cartels, law enforcement personnel, 
businessmen, local government officials, and ordinary civilians. Victims have been beheaded, 
dismembered, and even skinned or boiled alive (Grayson 2014a). 
Also in 2007, Operation Baja California, Operation Sinaloa, and Operation Chihuahua 
were launched to eliminate the operation areas of both the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas.  The entire 
police force in the town of Playas de Rosarito, Baja California, was disarmed under suspicions of 
collaborating with drug cartels. To assist in deterrence efforts, the United States announced it 
was implementing a drug trafficking law to impose financial sanctions on Mexican drug cartels. 
Also, during this year, the Mexican army made the largest weapon seizure in the history of 
Mexico. The seizure included 288 assault rifles, 126 handguns, 166 grenades, 14 TNT 
explosives, 500,000 cartridges, over 1,000 ammunition magazines, and a rocket launcher. 
Further evidence of the cartel’s militarization (Beals 2010; Bunker 2011b; Carriere 2017). 
In 2008, President Felipe Calderón proposed to break up the former Federal Preventive 
Police and replace it with a different organization (Sabet 2012). The new corporation became the 
Federal Police, and it provided support to the police as well as to the Federal District, states, and 
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municipalities. This decision was not entirely unexpected, given the insufficient number of 
convictions, the alarming increase of violence, abductions, and cases of corruption and 
complicity with organized crime elements. Once the decision was made, the Mexican 
government announced the intention of doubling the number of policemen in the PF to escalate 
the war against drug trafficking. The plan, known as the Comprehensive Strategy Against Drug 
Trafficking, also involved purging local police forces of corrupt officers. At the time of the 
announcement, elements of the plan had already been set in motion, including massive police 
recruiting and training efforts. They were to work closely with the military in dismantling the 
cartels. Of course, this was no easy feat (Sabet 2012). 
 Making the job of defeating and controlling the cartels harder was the issue of corruption. 
In April 2008, General Sergio Aponte, the man in charge of the anti-drug campaign in the state 
of Baja California, made several allegations of corruption against the police forces in the region 
(Mexican General 2008). Among his allegations, Aponte stated that he believed Baja California's 
anti-kidnapping squad was a kidnapping team working in conjunction with organized crime, and 
that bribed police units were being used as bodyguards for drug traffickers (Mexican General 
2008). These accusations sent shock waves through the state government (Brophy 2008). Many 
of the more than 50 accused officials quit. The progress against drug cartels in Mexico continued 
to be hindered by bribery, intimidation, and corruption; four months later the General was 
relieved of his command (Brophy 2008). 
At the same time, increasing evidence of the cartel’s militarization was beginning to 
become apparent. On July 16, 2008, the Mexican Navy intercepted a 10-meter long narco-
submarine traveling about 200 kilometers off the southwest of Oaxaca (Booth 2011). Special 
Forces rappelled from a helicopter onto the deck of the submarine and arrested four smugglers 
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before they could scuttle their vessel. The vessel was found to be loaded with 5.8 tons of cocaine 
and was towed to Huatulco, Oaxaca, by a Mexican Navy patrol boat (Booth 2011). 
In 2009, President Calderón called in an additional 5,000 Mexican Army troops to 
Ciudad Juárez (Wolff 2018). The DHS also said that it was considering using state National 
Guard troops to help the U.S. Border Patrol counter the threat of drug violence in Mexico from 
spilling over the border into the U.S (US plans 2009). The governors 
of Arizona and Texas encouraged the federal government to use additional National Guard 
troops from their states to help those already there supporting state law enforcement efforts 
against drug trafficking. Also, the Federal Preventive Police name was changed to Federal Police 
and its scope of responsibility expanded. Once this was complete, President Calderón abolished 
the AFI agency created in May 2009 and created an entirely new police force (Grayson 
2013). The new force has formed part of Mexico's first national crime information system, which 
stored the fingerprints of everyone arrested in the country. They also assumed the role of the 
Army in several parts of the country.  
 To combat the growing violence, President Calderón once again sends troops to a hostile 
region (Grayson 2013). This time, 10,000 more troops were sent to Ciudad Juarez but they had 
little impact on the violence (Wolff 2018). As a result, the violence crossed the border into 
Arizona. On March 23, 2010, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Mexico City to 
discuss border security and counter-narcotics efforts after the killing of three people connected to 
the U.S. consulate in the city of Ciudad Juarez (Wolffe 2018). The first three months of 2010 see 
a dramatic increase in drug trafficking-related deaths, totaling more than two thousand. U.S. and 
Mexican authorities introduce a “new stage” in bilateral border cooperation, named "Merida 2.0" 
after the 2008 Merida initiative (Wolffe 2018). The new plan expands aid to Mexico to fight 
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drug trafficking and reorients focus toward improving social and economic conditions (López-
González 2012). Following the success of capturing the “narco submarine”, the Mexican 
Navy began a sweep from the coasts of Tamaulipas to stop the violent cartels of the Gulf and 
the Zetas (Operation Northeast) (López-González 2012). This resulted in the withdrawal of both 
cartels allowing thousands of families to return to their homes. Also, the Regulation of the Law 
of the Federal Police was passed to establish the basic organizational structure of the 
Decentralized Administrative Body (López-González 2012). 
In 2011, Mexico's military captured 11,544 people who were believed to have been 
involved with the cartels and organized crime (Bunker 2011b). In the years prior, 28,000 
individuals were arrested on drug-related charges (Bunker 2011b). The decrease in eradication 
and drug seizures, as shown in statistics calculated by federal authorities, poorly reflected 
Calderón's security agenda (Wolffe 2014). Since the war began, over forty thousand people had 
been killed because of cartel violence (Wolffe 2014). During Calderón's presidential term, the 
murder rate of Mexico increased dramatically. Although Calderón set out to end the violent 
warfare between rival cartel leaders, critics argue that he inadvertently made the problem worse 
(Wolffe 2014). The methods that Calderón adopted involved confronting the cartels directly. 
These aggressive methods resulted in public killings and torture from both the cartels and the 
country's government forces. As cartel leaders were being removed from their positions, power 
struggles for leadership in the cartels become more intense, resulting in enhanced violence within 
the cartels themselves (Correa-Cabrera 2014). 
In a tangible record of cartel militarization, in 2011, a confrontation between the Federal 
Police forces and La Familia Michoacana in a ranch at Jilotlán de Los Dolores, in 
western Jalisco, left 11 La Familia gunmen killed and 36 arrested (Correa-Cabrera 2014). More 
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than 70 assault rifles were confiscated, along with 14 handguns, 3 grenades, 578 cartridges, 
20,000 rounds of ammunition, and 40 bullet-proof vests (Etter 2013). It was later discovered that 
La Familia Michoacana was planning a raid against the Knights Templar (Fundora 2018). At the 
same time, The United States government arrested 127 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection agents who were collaborating with the Mexican drug cartels and  the Mexican 
Army carried out an operation ('Operation Lince Norte') focused primarily on destroying the 
financial and logistic sectors of Los Zetas. Following this, the Mexican federal government 
launches the military-led project called Operación Veracruz Seguro (Bunker 2011b).   
Due to the harsh nature of Calderón’s practices, in 2012 Enrique Peña Nieto was elected. 
He campaigned that he “did not support the involvement of armed American agents in Mexico 
and that he was only interested in military training of Mexican forces in counter-
insurgency tactics” (Mexico’s Pena 2012). Peña stated that he planned to deescalate the conflict, 
focusing on lowering criminal violence rates, as opposed to the previous policy of attacking 
drug-trafficking organizations by arresting or killing the most-wanted drug lords and intercepting 
their drug shipments (Rosen 2016). One of his first actions as President was to propose the 
creation of a new unit to replace all Federal Police duties. He intended that the Federal Police 
would not be disbanded but would be assigned to special tasks & missions (Rosen 2016).  
Following this, and in response to the apparent failure of the Merida Initiative to 
fundamentally weaken the drug threat gripping the country, Enrique Pena Nieto announced a 
“Pact for Mexico” (Rosen 2016). The idea was to take the responsibility of the counter-narcotics 
function from the military and return it to law enforcement. To do this, the government pledged 
to create an entirely new paramilitary unit that was equipped and authorized to reestablish 
security across the country. 
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The answer was the National Gendarmerie.  The National Gendarmerie, which was 
modeled after counterparts in France and Spain, would be responsible for “strengthening 
territorial control in rural municipalities with the greatest institutional weakness, as well as 
strategic installations such as ports, airports, and borders.” (Rosen 2016). The force fell under the 
authority of the secretary of the interior and initially were 10,000-strong, with 8,000 personnel 
drawn from the army supplemented by 2,000 marines from the navy (Rosen 2016). The National 
Gendarmerie was to be divided into 14 regional commands that corresponded to major drug 
trafficking zones in the country (Rosen 2016). Three bases were established along the U.S.-
Mexico border to combat the militarization of the cartels, members would be thoroughly vetted, 
equipped with modern weaponry and body armor, and will have access to an air lift capacity of 
at least 24 helicopters (Rosen 2016).  
The government was not the only one looking to make changes. In 2013, Mexico saw the 
rise of the controversial Grupos de Autodefensa Comunitaria (self-defense groups) in southern 
Mexico (Andrews 2014; Heineman 2015). These were para-military groups led by land-
owners, ranchers, and other rural businessmen that took up arms against the criminal groups. 
Officials called this “a new phase in the Mexican war on drugs” (Andrews 2014; Heineman 
2015). However, this strategy, allegedly proposed by General Óscar Naranjo, Peña's security 
advisor from Colombia, crumbled when the Autodefensas started to have internal organizational 
struggles and disagreements with the government, being finally infiltrated by criminal elements, 
that deprived the government forces the ability to distinguish between armed-civilian convoys 
and drug-cartel convoys, forcing Peña's administration to distance from them (Kryt 2017). 
In 2014, the Gendarmerie Division was officially created and defined as a military/police 
force within the Federal Police (Bunker 2019). It consisted of 5,000 police agents with a focus 
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was on providing ongoing public security in areas with heavy criminal activities and providing 
border security. It was also expected to reinforce state, city, and municipal police forces when 
the need arose (Bunker 2019).  
In 2015, official reports of the U.S. government and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) revealed that Mexican cartels improved their firearm power and 
that 71% of their weapons come from the U.S (Bunker 2019). The Mexican cartels acquired 
those firearms mainly in the southern states of Texas, Arizona, and California (Bunker 2019). In 
December 2017, the Law of Internal Security was passed by legislation but was met with 
criticism, especially from the National Human Rights Commission, accusing it gave the 
President a “blank check” (Mexican Human 2018) (Supreme court 2018). 
The United Nations argued on 14 December 2016 that the militarization of public 
security in Mexico was a “mistake” as the country marked 10 years since the government began 
to deploy troops in a drug war that has killed and disappeared tens of thousands of people 
(Mexican Human 2018). “We do not have this opinion simply because we want to make 
someone feel uncomfortable or because we are against the current legislation," said the chairman 
of the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances, or CED, Santiago Corcuera. "But the 
reality was that the militarization of public security has been a mistake in all parts of the world, 
and that was proven." The UN envoy stressed that it was necessary to reconfigure police forces, 
which need to be adequately trained to be able to tackle organized crime and take direct 
responsibility for all tasks concerning public security, as opposed to deferring to the military 
(Floers-Macias et al 2019). 
In 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected. He campaigned on a promise to 
take the military off the streets of Mexico. Shortly after getting into office, Obrador released a 
52 
 
plan to create the National Guard under control of the Mexican Armed Forces which would be in 
charge of "preventing and combating crime". Obrador stated that the new National Guard would 
be critical to solving Mexico's ongoing security crisis. One of his campaign promises was a 
controversial "strategy for peace", that was to give amnesty to all Mexicans involved in drug 
production and trafficking to stop the drug trade and the resulting turf violence (Amnesty 
2018). Obrador pointed out that the past approaches failed because they were based on 
misunderstanding the core problem. According to him, the underlying issue was Mexico's 
great social disparities which previous governments' economic policies did not reduce. For law 
enforcement, he promised to hold a referendum for the creation of a temporary national guard, 
merging elite parts of the Federal Police, Military police, Navy, Chief of Staff's Guard, and other 
top Mexican Security agencies, intending to finally give a legal framework to the military-grade 
forces that have been doing police work in the last years (AMLO 2018). He promised not to use 
arms to suppress the people and announced to free political prisoners. His approach was to pay 
more attention to the victims of violent crime and he wants to revisit two previously taken 
strategies. 
In 2019, Mexico's General Congress voted to approve a 60,000-member national 
guard. and on 30 June 2019, the National Guard was officially established in the Constitution of 
Mexico. The new National Guard, the de facto successor to a similar formation raised in 1821 
and abolished in 1935, was composed of personnel from parts of both the National Gendarmerie 
and Federal Forces Divisions of the Federal Police. PF was established as a central element of 
the strategy against organized crime and criminality in Mexico, not only to prevent crimes and 
federal jurisdiction at the federal level but to become an institution of excellence, capable of 
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cooperating with local police and prosecutors in investigating the crimes of high social impact. 
Compliance with the legal framework to combat organized crime and drugs. 
Finally, on, January 30, 2019, Obrador declared the end of the Mexican war on 
drugs stating that he would now focus on reducing spending, and direct its military and police 
efforts primarily on stopping the armed gasoline theft rings (Saul 2019). This has done little to 
deter the cartels and has driven them underground (Beith 2019). In 2020, official reports 
from  U.S. Customs and Border Protection state that a smuggling tunnel measuring 1,313 meters 
or 4,309 feet running from Tijuana to San Diego, was discovered, making it the longest drug-
smuggling tunnel ever discovered along the Mexico–United States border (Border Patrol). 
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Chapter 3 Militarization of Crime Syndicates 
The beginning of the Mexican drug cartels can be traced to former Mexican Judicial 
Federal Police agent Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo. Gallardo founded the Guadalajara Cartel in 
1980 and controlled most of the illegal drug trade in Mexico and the trafficking corridors across 
the Mexico–U.S. border along with Juan García Ábrego throughout the 1980s. Taking advantage 
of his former position within the Federal Police, Gallardo utilized bribes, threats, and law 
enforcement tactics to grow his enterprise. This resulted in corruption being inwoven into the 
cartels' makeup from the very beginning and continuing into the present day. The corruption 
theme dominates both the cartel's reputation as well as the reputation of Mexico as a country. 
Recently, there have been two main factors in the rise of militarized crime syndicates. 
First, socioeconomic factors, such as economic growth, unemployment, inequality, and poverty. 
Second, institutionalized dynamics, such as the change in Mexico’s political regime and the 
resulting decline in the State–organized crime nexus (Guadalupe, Keck, and Nava 2015). These 
factors have created a vacuum that has been actively filled by growing crime syndicates that 
have quickly adapted militaristic ways to take advantage of the situation. 
In some regions of Mexico, non-state actors such as drug trafficking organizations, 
through bribes and terrorist practices, have gained access to the institutional as well as the social 
fabric of entire regions (Guadalupe et al. 2015). They have created communities where the power 
of the State, if not supplanted, was shared (Guadalupe et al. 2015). In certain regions of the 
country, this situation has effectively weakened the stance of the government not only in the eyes 
of the criminal groups but also in the eyes of the population, reducing the State to merely a 
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political facade while real power was exerted by private individuals (Guadalupe et al. 2015). 
This has given rise to a large network of crime syndicates that have adapted to the methods used 
against them and adopted paramilitary tactics and equipment. 
Although these crime syndicates cannot be described as sanctioned paramilitary units, the 
term alludes to the change in operational and institutional practices by criminal organizations to 
attain regional or national control over other market competitors (other criminal organizations), 
as well as over state forces (Guadalupe et al. 2015). In some regions of the country, especially 
along the border region, through the usage of these new tactics and based primarily on the 
exercise of extreme violence and military techniques, organized crime has functioned as an 
alternative state (Guadalupe et al. 2015). At the same time, these new paramilitary criminal 
syndicates have been able to corrupt state, local, and even federal law enforcement authorities 
(Guadalupe et al. 2015).  
A good example was the results from federal operations. Before the introduction of 
Operation Safeguard in Arizona, migrants typically paid a coyote, a human smuggler, to help 
them cross the border (Michalowski 2020) This usually occurred somewhere near Nogales, 
Douglas, or San Luis. Once across the border, they would meet up with a friend or another 
smuggler who would drive them to their first stopping point (Michalowski 2020). From there, 
migrants would travel on their own to their destination. Also, many migrants simply slipped 
across the boundary into larger border towns without the aid of a coyote. “As the risks and 
difficulties associated with border crossing increased, smaller mom and pop coyote operations 
either grew into larger organizations, folded, or were driven out of business, sometimes at the 
point of a gun, by emerging criminal syndicates” (Michalowski 2020). Faced with an 
increasingly militarized border, migrants seeking entry into the U.S. had little choice but to 
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engage the services of these new criminal syndicates (Michalowski 2020). The cartels then 
preyed on the desperation of the migrants and utilized these runs to increase their drug 
smuggling operations. 
History 
Towards the end of the 1960s, Mexican narcotic smugglers started to smuggle drugs to 
America on a large-scale basis (Vulliamy 2010). Due to the fragmented nature of the smugglers, 
the balance of power continually shifted as new organizations emerged and older ones weakened 
and collapsed. A disruption in the system, such as the arrests or deaths of leaders, generated 
bloodshed as rivals moved in to exploit the power vacuum. This power vacuum generated 
violence that impacted civilians and smugglers alike. While many factors contributed to the 
escalating violence, security analysts in Mexico City traced the origins to the unraveling of a 
longtime implicit arrangement between narcotics traffickers and governments controlled by the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which began to lose its grip on political power in the late 
1980s 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, Colombia's Pablo Escobar was the main exporter of 
cocaine and dealt with organized criminal networks all over the world (DEA History 2006). 
While Escobar's Medellin Cartel and the Cali Cartel would manufacture the products, Miguel 
Ángel Félix Gallardo's Guadalajara Cartel would oversee distribution (Beittel 2015) (DEA 
History 2006). When enforcement efforts intensified in South Florida and the Caribbean, the 
Colombian organizations formed partnerships with the Mexico-based traffickers to transport 
cocaine by land through Mexico into the United States. As a result, the birth of most Mexican 
drug cartels was traced to former Mexican Judicial Federal Police agent Miguel Ángel Félix 
Gallardo (Padgett 2001) (Beittel 2015). There were no other cartels at this time and the earliest 
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use of military equipment by the cartels occurred in 1979 with the Dadeland Mall shooting in 
Florida, tied to a Colombian cartel assassination team using improvised ballistic protection in a 
delivery truck (Beith 2010). 
Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo was arrested in 1989. At that time, he was the leader of the 
Guadalajara Cartel, an alliance of the current existing cartels (which included the Sinaloa Cartel, 
the Juarez Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel, and the Sonora Cartel). Due to his arrest, the alliance broke 
apart and each subsection fought for control of territory and trafficking routes (Seelke 2013). To 
avoid the cartel from being captured by law enforcement, Gallardo, divided up the trade he 
controlled and privatized the Mexican drug business. The Tijuana route went to his nephews, the 
Arellano Felix brothers. The Ciudad Juárez route went to the Carrillo Fuentes family. Miguel 
Caro Quintero would run the Sonora corridor and Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Ismael Zambada 
García would take over Pacific coast operations (becoming the Sinaloa Cartel). The control of 
the Matamoros, Tamaulipas corridor (Gulf Cartel) would be left undisturbed to its founder Juan 
García Ábrego, who was not a party to the 1989 pact. Gallardo still planned to oversee national 
operations, as he maintained important connections, but he would no longer control all details of 
the business. When he was transferred to a high-security prison in 1993, he lost any remaining 
control over the other drug lords. 
In 1999, Gulf Cartel's leader, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, hired a group of 37 corrupt former 
elite military soldiers to work for him. These former Airmobile Special Forces Group (GAFE), 
and Amphibian Group of Special Forces (GANFE) soldiers became known as Los Zetas and 
began operating as a private army author’s  for the Gulf Cartel. During the early 2000s, the Zetas 
were instrumental in the Gulf Cartel's domination of the drug trade in much of Mexico. The 
Zetas were and still are notorious for targeting civilians. In recent years, The Zetas have involved 
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themselves in more than drug trafficking and have also been connected to human trafficking, 
pipeline trafficked oil theft, extortion, and trading unlicensed CDs. Their criminal network was 
said to reach far from Mexico including into Central America, the U.S., and Europe. 
In 2003 The Sinaloa Cartel began to contest the Gulf Cartel's domination of the coveted 
southwest Texas corridor following the arrest of Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas in March 
2003. The "Federation" was the result of a 2006 accord between several groups located in the 
Pacific state of Sinaloa. The cartel was led by Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, who was Mexico's 
most-wanted drug trafficker with an estimated net worth of U.S. $1 billion. New alliances were 
formed against Los Zetas and Beltrán-Leyva Cartel (Drug wars 2010).  
The Sinaloa Cartel fought the Juárez Cartel in a long and bloody battle for control over 
drug trafficking routes in and around the northern city of Ciudad Juárez. The battle eventually 
resulted in defeat for the Juárez Cartel, but not before taking the lives of between 5,000 and 
12,000 people (Drug wars 2010).  During the war for the turf in Ciudad Juárez the Sinaloa Cartel 
used several gangs (e.g. Los Mexicles, the Artistas Asesinos and Gente Nueva) to attack the 
Juárez Cartel (Drug wars 2010). The Juárez Cartel similarly used gangs such as La Línea and 
the Barrio Azteca to fight the Sinaloa Cartel (Drug wars 2010).  
It was estimated that in the first eight months of 2005 (between January and August) 
about 110 people died in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas because of the fighting between the Gulf 
and Sinaloa cartels. The same year, there was another surge in violence in the state 
of Michoacán as the La Familia Michoacana drug cartel established itself, after splintering from 
its former allies, the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. 
In 2006, roughly half a dozen drug cartels exist in Mexico. Each of the organizations was 
large and dominated huge parts of Mexico's territorial landscape, and operated internationally 
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and overseas as well. As a result, the Mexican military began to intervene and on December 11, 
2006, the newly elected President Felipe Calderón, dispatched 6,500 Mexican Army 
author’s  soldiers to Michoacán, to end drug violence there (Mexican Government 2002). This 
action was regarded as the first major retaliation made against the cartel violence and was 
generally viewed as the starting point of the Mexican drug war between the government and the 
drug cartels. 
In 2007, Mexican drug cartels dominate the wholesale illicit drug market and controlled 
90% of the cocaine entering the United States (Cook 2007). The Juárez Cartel was still locked in 
a vicious battle with its former partner, the Sinaloa Cartel, for control of Ciudad Juárez. La Línea 
was a group of Mexican drug traffickers and corrupt Juárez and Chihuahua state police officers 
who work as the armed wing of the Juárez Cartel. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes headed the Juárez 
Cartel until his arrest in 2014. The Juárez Cartel controls one of the primary transportation routes 
for billions of dollars’ worth of illegal drug shipments annually entering the United States from 
Mexico. In the later months of 2007, the Zetas struck out on their own and set up their 
independent drug, arms, and human-trafficking networks. 
In 2008, Los Zetas made a deal with ex-Sinaloa cartel commanders, the Beltrán-Leyva 
brothers and since then, became rivals of their former employer/partner, the Gulf Cartel. Also, 
Guzman's hitmen take on the Juarez cartel in the northern border city of Ciudad Juarez, across 
from El Paso, Texas, which quickly becomes the drug war's bloodiest flashpoint. On April 26, 
2008, a major battle took place between members of the Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels in the city of 
Tijuana, Baja California, that left 17 people dead. 
 On November 6, 2008, the Mexican army made the largest weapon seizure in the history 
of Mexico. The seizure included 288 assault rifles, 126 handguns, 166 grenades, 14 TNT 
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explosives, 500,000 cartridges, over 1,000 ammunition magazines, and a rocket launcher 
(Fundora 2018).  
As of 2009, The Los Zeta’s controlled more than half of the state of Tamaulipas and a 
quarter of the national territory, which made it the most dangerous organization in the country. In 
2010 the Zetas made public their split from the Gulf Cartel and began a bloody war with the Gulf 
Cartel over control of northeast Mexico's drug trade routes. This war has resulted in the deaths of 
thousands of cartel members and suspected members. Furthermore, due to alliance structures, the 
Gulf Cartel-Los Zetas conflict drew in other cartels, namely the Sinaloa Cartel which fought the 
Zetas in 2010 and 2011. 
In February 2010, a war broke out between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas, mainly in the 
state of Tamaulipas a result, numerous border cities became "ghost towns", such was the case of 
the border strip known as "La Frontera Chica" made up of the cities of Miguel Alemán, Mier, 
Camargo, and Nueva Ciudad Guerrero. That was why in November 2010 the Mexican army 
together with the Federal Police and the Navy, extended their activities and launched an 
operation around the north of the state of Tamaulipas, allowing hundreds of families to return to 
their homes after months of exile in other states, mainly in municipalities such as Mier, where 
around 4000 people return (AFP 2013). Calderón said the cartels were seeking to "replace the 
government" and "to be trying to impose a monopoly through force of arms (Mexican cartels 
move 2010). 
In May 2010, numerous reports by Mexican and U.S. media stated that Sinaloa had 
infiltrated the Mexican federal government and military, and colluded with it to destroy the other 
cartels. The Colima, Sonora and Milenio Cartels are now branches of the Sinaloa Cartel. Also, in 
May 2010, an NPR report collected allegations from dozens of sources, including U.S. and 
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Mexican media, Mexican police officials, politicians, academics, and others, that Sinaloa Cartel 
had infiltrated and corrupted the Mexican federal government and the Mexican military by 
bribery and other means. According to a report by the U.S. Army Intelligence section in 
Leavenworth, over 6 years, of the 250,000 soldiers in the Mexican Army, 150,000 deserted and 
went into the drug industry (Charles Bowden 2014). Also, the 2010 NPR report stated that 
Sinaloa was colluding with the government to destroy other cartels and protect itself and its 
leader, 'Chapo'. Mexican officials denied any corruption in the government's treatment of drug 
cartels (John Burnett and Marisa Peñaloza. Cartels had previously been reported as difficult to 
prosecute "because members of the cartels have infiltrated and corrupted the law enforcement 
organizations that are supposed to prosecute them, such as the Office of the Attorney 
General."(Zamora 2003).  
As a result of the report, the cartels grow more brazen, killing three people linked to the 
U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juarez, murdering a gubernatorial election candidate in the increasingly 
lawless northeastern state of Tamaulipas, and setting off car bombs. Mass killings at drug 
rehabilitation centers and parties become common and mayors and local officials are 
assassinated. Although weakened in 2011, the Juárez Cartel still controlled the three main entry 
points into El Paso, Texas.  
 In 2015, official reports of the U.S. government and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) revealed that over the last years, Mexican cartels improved their 
firearm power and that 71% of their weapons come from the U.S (ATF). In 2017, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that the war in Syria was the world's most 
lethal conflict for the fifth year in a row. But it claims Mexico’s, criminal cartels claimed 23,000 
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lives in 2016. "The death toll in Mexico's conflict surpasses those for Afghanistan and Somalia," 
said John Chipman, who heads the IISS (Carriere 2017). 
Finally, in 2020, The overall level of drug-related violence in Mexico has exceeded even 
those that characterized the 2006-2012 period during President Felipe Calderon’s militarized 
anti-drug crusade. Homicides, the vast majority of which are related to the drug trade, exceeded 
33,300 in 2018. That was a one-third increase over 2017, During the first half of 2019, the death 
toll was at a similar pace. Even before the 2019 figures were released, more than 135,000 victims 
had perished since 2012, when Calderon left office. 
Cartel Influence (Figure 3) 
Traditionally, the narcotics cartels maximized earnings by working with police, military 
officers, and officeholders affiliated with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which 
dominated the political landscape from 1929 to 2000 (Grayson 2014). This was made possible 
because of an informal set of rules that benefited all parties. On the one hand, officials made 
money by turning a blind eye to or employing the Federal Judicial Police and other agencies to 
facilitate, the growing, storage, processing, and export of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and 
methamphetamines (Grayson 2014). In return for this treatment, the Cartels were expected to 
keep substances away from children, leave civilians (especially Americans) alone, and limit their 
arsenals to weapons less powerful than those possessed by the armed forces (Grayson 2014). 
Meanwhile, the Cartels only executed enemies in remote areas, obtained permission from rivals 
before crossing their territory, and demonstrated respect for mayors, governors, and other 
prominent figures (Grayson 2014). As a result of these rules, officeholders often communicated 
with the Cartels (Grayson 2014).  
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While this was one of many factors that have contributed to the escalating violence, 
Mexico City Security Analysts traced the origins to the unraveling of a longtime implicit 
arrangement between narcotics traffickers and governments controlled by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), which began to lose its grip on political power in the late 1980s. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, Colombia's Pablo Escobar was the main exporter 
of cocaine and dealt with organized criminal networks all over the world. While 
Escobar's Medellin Cartel and the Cali Cartel would manufacture the products, Miguel Ángel 
Félix Gallardo's Guadalajara Cartel would oversee distribution. When enforcement efforts 
intensified in South Florida and the Caribbean, the Colombian organizations formed partnerships 
with the Mexico-based traffickers to transport cocaine by land through Mexico into the United 
States 
 This ad hoc pact system lasted until the late-1970s, early-1980s when multiple factors 
led to the erosion of the PRI’s sway over society, giving rise to a more transparent society. In 
1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement multiplied trilateral trade in legal and illegal 
substances, and the success of the U.S. efforts to stanch the influx of Colombian cocaine into 
Florida forced the Medellín and Cali cartels to use Central America and Mexico as their major 
thoroughfare to America (Grayson 2014). What had once been a multimillion-dollar enterprise 
became a multibillion-dollar venture. A change that further undermined the PRI government-
narcotic unofficial understanding (Grayson 2014). The early 2000s saw a shift away from the 
traditional understanding and started a crackdown on cartels in their turf.  
Between 2006 and mid-2011, the number of Mexican cartels increased from six to 
sixteen, seven of which played a major role in the drug-trafficking business and nine of which 
exercised less influence in the drug market 
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The cooperation between the United States and Mexico and the election of President 
Calderon saw a revamping of agencies and the removal of cartel leaders. However, they did little 
in curbing the cartel's violence. For example, the 2007 Merida Initiative saw a massive increase 
in violence and it also failed to significantly disrupt syndicate activity. Calderon’s approach had 
little impact on corruption overall. Cartels continued to enjoy an exceptionally strong influence 
over municipal law enforcement, which according to former Public Security Secretary Genaro 
Garcia “supplemented” operational and organizational budgets with up to 1.2 billion pesos ($94 
million) of criminal money. Syndicates also retained inroads to both the Federal Police and the 
judicial system, reflected by the remarkable state of impunity that existed in Mexico. In 2007, 10 
major cartels operated in the country. They competed with one another on numerous fronts and 

















Drug trafficking and criminal organizations in Mexico have grown and strength over the 
last decade, fueled by a northward flow of illegal drugs and human trafficking and a southward 




while drug money further corrupts institutions and reduces public trust in the authorities. 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations generate between $17 billion and $38.3 billion in annual 
sales from Colombian-produced cocaine and Mexican heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana, 
according to the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC 2012). 
In the case of the militarization of cartel’s, it can be traced to the combining of Mexican 
special forces into organized crime beginning in the 1990s when the Gulf cartel recruited a group 
of ex-Gafe troops to create its paramilitary enforcement unit, known as Los Zetas (Guadalupe 
2015) (Narco vehicles). According to Mexico’s defense ministry, about 1,383 elite soldiers 
deserted between 1994 and 2015 (Guadalupe 2015). Defectors included members of units that 
received training in counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, interrogation, and strategy from 
French, Israeli, and U.S. advisers (Narco Vehicles). 
The Zeta’s, originally formed in the mid-1990s by deserters from Mexico’s Special 
Forces, served as a quasi-praetorian guard for former Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillén 
(Guadalupe 2015). Cardenas Guillén’s leadership style relied on the use of violence to exert 
control (Guadalupe 2015). To do this, he introduced professionally formed enforcer groups into 
the realm of drug trafficking, changing the way negotiations were conducted (Flores 2010; 
Guadalupe 2015). As a result of his actions, the introduction of a more militarized element to 
settle disputes of criminal organizations allowed for the expansion of drug trafficking 
organizations into truly transnational entities (Guadalupe 2015). They eventually turned and 
established the Zetas as a cartel. But other narco bosses followed suit, turning to the military for 
skilled recruits. 
One of the most critical factors that have influenced the current wave of violence that is 
afflicting Mexico and the southern United States border, is the militarization that crime 
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syndicates underwent as a response to increased militaristic border activity (Guadalupe 2015).   
Names such as Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, Los Caballeros Templarios (Knights Templar), La 
Linea, Gente Nueva, Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, Artistas Asesinos, Barrio Azteca and 
other transnational gangs, as well as the recent inclusion of foreign military personnel (e.g., 
Guatemalan Special Forces soldiers), created more brutal methods and institutional mindsets that 
have paramilitary connotations (Guadalupe 2015).  
One important distinction that exists between law enforcement militarization and crime 
syndicate militarization is that despite branching out and influencing other activities, including 
political arenas, crime syndicates are fundamentally money-driven organizations, lacking 
political/societal values or interests, such as those exhibited by traditional paramilitary groups 
(Guadalupe 2015). Moreover, while they may be in league with state elements, they are not 
linked directly to the State. Their economic power and professionalization levels allow these 
crime syndicates to transform and turn themselves into competing non-state actors that not only 
engage in harsh and violent control but also, in some areas, taking over State functions of 
providing security and projecting power (Guadalupe 2015). In essence, While Mexican enforcer 
groups may lack a political base, their progressive specialization has allowed them to use 
violence not only as a “tool of the trade” but as a form of social control as well (Guadalupe 
2015). 
Narco Weapons and Tactics 
"The Mexican cartels operate like a sophisticated terror group and use advanced weapons 
to kill and intimidate. They use military-grade weapons and are a serious national security threat 
to the U.S.," Derek Maltz, a former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) head of the Special 
Operations Division, told Fox News. "As the Mexican cartels expand their operations around the 
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world and grow their revenue, they utilize the latest and greatest technology and buy the top-of-
the-line weapons." 
The most common weapons used today by the cartels are the AR-15, M16, M4, AK-
47, AKM, and Type 56 assault rifles (Castillo 2009). Handguns are very diverse, but the FN 
Five-seven is a popular choice due to its armor-piercing capability (Castillo 2009). Grenade 
launchers are known to have been used against Mexican security forces, H&K G36s and M4 
carbines with M203 grenade launchers have been confiscated (Castillo 2009). 
After years of failed U.S. and Mexican efforts to curb arms trafficking, groups such as the 
Jalisco New Generation and Sinaloa cartels are showcasing the military-grade weapons in slick 
propaganda videos and using them to defeat security forces in battle. However, cartels have been 
using military style gear since in the 80’s. 
In 1980, the emergence of ‘narco tanks’ in Mexico – improvised armored vehicles used 
by narcotraffickers – was first reported.  In addition, uniforms and body armor started to be worn 
by cartel personnel who also had highly specialized military or law enforcement training and the 
use of assault rifles and various forms of grenades were quite common. 
The 1990’s saw the use of armored sport utility vehicles (SUV). These were often 
modified semi-trucks, SUVs, or other large vehicles equipped with varying levels of protection 
and attack capability. Even smaller narco tanks were plated with two inches (5.1 cm) 
of steel armor initial deployment of IAFVs in 2010.  This became known as “narco armor” 
Mexican cartel increased use of IAFVs and armored sport utility vehicles (ASUV) yielded some 
important lessons for military counter-criminal insurgency efforts. Increased reports of these 
vehicles being fielded spanned roughly from mid-2010 to the beginning of 2012, with a spike in 
activity surrounding them taking place around mid-2011. These vehicles had predominantly been 
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utilized in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas in engagements between the Zetas and Gulf cartels 
and in a few other locales 
Bunker also cites the use of heavy machine guns and anti-materiel rifles, specifically the 
.50 Cal Barrett, as being present within some cartel units, alongside rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs) that typically use older warhead variants 2014). The likes of anti-personnel and anti-tank 
mines and car bombs (VBIEDs) have not yet been recorded in Mexico (as they have in 
Colombia). Nor are sniping techniques considered to be well developed despite scopes and night-
vision optics being employed.  
Concern exists however that in some regions, gangs and other organized criminals are 
slowly evolving in sophistication, having been directly influenced by cartel and guerrilla 
personnel deployed within their locales. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported 
in 2017 that the war in Syria was the world's most lethal conflict for the fifth year in a row. But 
Mexico claimed second place. "The death toll on 23,000 (2016) in Mexico's conflict surpasses 
those for Afghanistan and Somalia," said John Chipman, who heads the IISS. "This was even 
more surprising, considering that the conflict deaths are nearly all attributable to small arms. 
Mexico was a conflict marked by the absence of artillery, tanks, or combat aviation," Chipman 
added. Besides Syria and Mexico, the most lethal conflicts were in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, South Sudan, and Nigeria. 
In 2017, the first-ever narco submarine used for smuggling purposes was seized off the 
European coast by Spanish authorities. While this craft, not yet fully submersible, was linked to 
cartels in Colombia, intelligence reports indicate that Mexico's outfits have similar capabilities 
when it comes to self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) or low-profile vessels (LPV). 
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"This model for trafficking drugs has been used since 1993, and the cartels began using it 
with semi-submersible submarines so that most of the cabin and exhaust pipes are visible above 
the water," Oughton explained. "However, there are already new completely submersible models 
designed not to be detected by infrared ray systems, radar, or sonars, and even when they are 
capable of transporting large amounts of drugs, their construction was complicated, and if they 
are discovered, the losses are considerable." 
"Now, we know that the use of narco subs and narco torpedoes as tactical weapons are 
being tested in Mexico by the Sinaloa and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion," he said. "And 
the Cartel del Golf mainly, with the support of Colombian cartels and terrorist groups including 
Hezbollah, and operatives from Al Qaeda and the Islamic State." 
In the past few years, due to the changing dynamics of public security policies and the 
new configuration of organized crime, the once few and powerful organizations that had 
controlled the main drug trafficking routes within Mexico have been fighting constantly among 
themselves and have also experienced a series of internal fights and divisions (Guadalupe 2015). 
Of these, two cartels were especially powerful and far-reaching: the Sinaloa Federation, 
primarily based in northwest Mexico and down the Baja Peninsula; and the Los Zetas, which 
dominated the northeast and areas around the Gulf of Mexico. While there are dozens of cartels 
spanning Mexico with a varying weapons depository, analysts are pointing more and more to the 
Jalisco Nueva Generacion as the one not only responsible for the shifting of approximately one-
third of all drugs from Mexico into the United States but also as using that revenue to develop a 




There was strong evidence that most weapons and arms trafficked into Mexico come 
from gun dealers in the United States. Studies have indicated that many traceable weapons came 
from the American Operation "Fast and Furious", and there was a geographic coincidence 
between the supposed American origin of the firearms and the places where these weapons are 
seized, mainly in the northern Mexican states. Most grenades and rocket-launchers are smuggled 
through Guatemalan borders from Central America. However, some grenades are also smuggled 
from the US to Mexico or stolen from the Mexican military. United States Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) officials have stated that the statistic was misleading: out of 
approximately 30,000 weapons seized in drug cases in Mexico in 2004–2008, 7,200 appeared to 
be of U.S. origin, approximately 4,000 were found in ATF manufacturer and importer records, 
and 87 percent of those—3,480—originated in the United States.  
It is important to know that Mexicans have a constitutional right to own firearms, but 
legal purchases are difficult (Thompson 2010) That is what makes the smuggling of weapons so 
lucrative. To control the smuggling of firearms, the U.S. government was assisting Mexico with 
technology, equipment, and training (Thompson 2010). Project Gunrunner was one such effort 
between the U.S. and Mexico to collaborate in tracing Mexican guns which were manufactured 
in or imported legally to the U.S. (OIG 2010).  
Since 2014, a report by Robotics Business Review affirmed that Mexican cartels learned 
to build and use drones for their criminal activities explaining that a drone can carry more than 
220 pounds of cocaine (Sullivan 2017). In 2013 reports surfaced that Mexico’s Jalisco New 
Generation Cartel (CJNG) now possess bomb-toting drones. While the cartels were previously 
known to utilize aerial capabilities to disseminate drugs over border barriers and conduct 
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surveillance, the recent findings have raised deeper questions over their battle-ready tactics. To 
supplement this, two dozen of the explosive-charged quadcopters were reportedly recovered 
from a cartel car in Michoacán state in late July, the container-like bombs stuffed with C4 
charges and ball bearings to function as shrapnel and be adhered to the drones. "Between 2012 
and 2017, Mexican cartels operated 850 incursions into the United States through drones," 
observed Lee Oughton, co-founder, and COO of the Mexico-based Fortress Risk Management, 
citing government data and intelligence collection (Sullivan 2017). "Mainly, the cartels of 
Sinaloa, Los Zetas, and Jalisco Nueva Generación have surpassed the Mexican and U.S. 
authorities with their drone fleets." (Sullivan 2017) 
Drones are not the only concern. During the arrest of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman's son, 
cartel operatives fought with Barrett .50-caliber anti-materiel rifles, staggering .50-caliber M2 
machine guns hoisted to gun trucks, and at least one vehicle with an "improvised armored turret-
like structure in the back," deemed "narco tanks" in scenes that mirrored the urban fighting 
jungles of Mosul rather than Mexico (Sullivan 2017). 
Earlier in 2013, Mexican authorities also tweeted images of a homemade tank they 
unearthed while patrolling the rural plains of San Jose de Chila, slightly west of Mexico City." 
personnel located a van with handmade armor, allegedly used by a criminal group in the area," 
Mexico's National Guard wrote. The do-it-yourself armored carriers are colloquially referenced 
as the "Rhinoceros, "Batmobile," "Monster" or even the "Popemobile," the Mexico Daily News 
reported. Some are additionally furnished with inch-thick steel panels and retain the capability of 
traveling close to 70 miles per hour while heaving out nails and oil slicks to offset pursuers from 
the rear. Oughton highlighted that armored vans used mostly by the CJNG include everything 
from Ford F150 and 250, to Dodge Ram 1500, to Jeep Wranglers, Hummers, and Chevrolet 
72 
 
Colorado’s. He also underscored that, based on extensive intelligence gathering, the major 
cartels have multiple frag rag grenades, Molotov pumps (Sullivan 2017). 
In 2010, The New York Times wrote an article that claimed from 2006-2010 that 51 
unauthorized tunnels running under the border walls had been found in Nogales, Arizona, and 
Nogales, Sonora. The main purpose of the tunnels was for drug trafficking, not immigration. 
Reports of Narco vehicles being fielded span roughly from mid-2010 to the beginning of 
2012, with a spike in activity surrounding them taking place around mid-2011. These vehicles 
had predominantly been utilized in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas in engagements between the 
Zetas and Gulf cartels and in a few other locales 
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Chapter 4 The Look into a Mindset 
This research was conducted utilizing an exploratory, mixed-method, content analysis, 
approach. The research data is comprised of open-source news data focused on the militarization 
of law enforcement and the Mexican cartels during the thirty years from 1990-2020. The 
research focused on determining: 
1. How, when, and at what pace did police militarize in the United States?  
2. How, when, and at what pace did cartels militarize in Mexico? 
3. How does the pace of local United States law enforcement compare to the pace of the 
cartels. 
4. What is the relationship, if any, between the two. 
5. How have both police and cartel militarization been framed in the media? 
Due to the size of the southern border, the research is tailored to the militarization in the 
areas of Tijuana Mexico, Nogales Mexico, and Ciudad Juarez Mexico, in response to the 
militarization of law enforcement in the adjourning cities of San Diego California, Nogales 
Arizona, and El Paso Texas. The justification for these areas is that they had a U.S.-Mexico 
population counterpart to provide quantitative and qualitative data. This allowed research 
gathering from multiple points of view. 
Hypothesis 
Crime syndicates, facing increasing militaristic methods responded through a protective 
theme by adapting their methods, equipment, and tactics to mirror those used against them. 
These policies and actions have resulted in the increasing militarization of both the law 
enforcement and local crime syndicates along the U.S -Mexico border. A separate empirical 
question could be addressed in that unless direct action is taken to curb law enforcement 
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militarization, the upward trend will continue and primarily affect those communities on the 
southern border. 
Limitations 
During the analysis portion of the research, the author identified certain limitations.  
The first being a question of sufficient cultural context with respect to geographic 
locations and communities. In other words, the proximity to the locations chosen limited the 
author’s knowledge of the area. As a result, the author is unfamiliar with nicknames or what the 
area speakers call the legislation. the author must refer to the actual name. This should not be an 
issue in news but the news caters to a source and speak in direct terms. This can be overcome in 
the future by visiting the area, interviewing subject matter experts such as reporters, news 
sources, or Border Patrol agents to get a first-hand account. 
The second being that the author would need greater access to news sources as well as 
additional time to put a year-by-year timeline together rather than a generalized historical 
timeline. 
Design. 
Understanding the topic of militarization, in addition to working on ways to reduce its 
impact requires creative thinking and understanding the issue from multiple points of view. This 
means that a researcher should consider the cultural, societal, secondary effects, to fully embrace 
what it means to be institutionalized. A unique way of thinking about it to consider militarization 
as an enforcement tool that creates a perpetual cycle. First, Militarization is a policy that attempts 
to addresses deviance. It does this by utilizing the policy that has its origin in “state” efforts to 
maintain social control/social order. Deviance creates crime, crime creates deviance. Actors want 
to decrease both crime and deviance. Strategies over the years have resulted in the militarization 
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of law enforcement through legislation. This legislation/militarization has secondary impacts, 
such as the cartels militarizing to meet the threat. This mirrors the perpetual cycle of crime and 
deviance. In essence, we create the issue by trying to fix the issue. We then must increase our 
efforts to address the new issue that we created, repeating the cycle. To further elaborate, the 
authors argument can be boiled down to “Laws create crime, crime influences/creates laws”.  
Selected research supports the fact that legislation is created to address deviance (in this 
case, drugs) and made crimes of acts that were legal up until this point (working in the U.S. by 
day, returning to Mexico by night). Once this was made illegal (or more difficult), laws were 
created to address the “rising number of people trying to come to the U.S. This then created more 
“deviants” that influenced harsher laws (Militarization, which spread to the institutionalization of 
social, political, economic aspects). This means that the standard quantitative approach would 
not gather the cultural aspects of how cartels came to be, the influence and the vacuum they 
create through violence, and the effect on the population both directly and indirectly. 
As a result, the design of the research included an exploratory, mixed methods, content 
analysis approach with open-source data to see how militarization is being discussed. The 
research covered thirty years, beginning in 1990, with focus on events immediately the following 
legislation. Legislation included but is not limited to, Secure Border Initiative in 2005, the 
Secure Communities Initiative in 2008, replacement of Secure Communities in 2014 with 
Priority Enforcement Programs, and the executive orders in 2015 and 2017 issued by President 
Obama and President Trump. Covered events included federal operations, legislation, local news 
reporting. Following the content analysis, performance of the mapping of the militarization of 
the crime syndicates in the areas of Tijuana, Nogales, and Ciudad Juarez in response to the 
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militarization of law enforcement in the adjourning cities of San Diego CA, Nogales AZ, and El 
Paso TX based on reporting of local news sources.  
The mixed methods approach utilized by the author strengthens the quantitative approach 
by not only discussing the “what” but by exploring the “why” which opens the subjective matter 
that results due to creative thinking in ways that will affect future policy. In their argument, thew 
author makes the claim that Militarization, on all fronts, is a protective perpetuating cycle that 
requires a different approach to break. To do this, they grounded any qualitative analysis in 
quantitative data, whether that is word count, times mentioned, etc. The result is that future 
researchers can build on the thought process and approach the issue from multiple angles, taking 
various viewpoints (Cultural, Systematic, Community Oriented, etc) into account.  
Nominal definitions. Define central terms. 
Historically, law enforcement and the military have served different purposes. In essence, 
the military’s mission is to “search and destroy” enemies located outside the United States, while 
the mission of local police is to “serve and protect” (Kraska 2007).  This is reinforced through 
the definitions provided in academic writings (Kraska 2007) (Coyne and Hall 2013) (The 
Constitution Project 2015).  
Kraska (2007) defines police militarization as the process in which civilian law 
enforcement replicates their departments after military culture and behavior. This militarization 
includes engaging in military-style training, acquiring military weapons, and utilizing military 
tactics in everyday operations (Coyne and Hall 2013).  Coyne and Hall (2013) define state and 
law enforcement responsibilities as upholding domestic laws that protect citizens. The 
Department of the Army (1962), in contrast, defines the military's responsibility as training and 
engaging in combat with an external enemy deemed a threat to citizens to destroy them (Coyne 
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and Hall 2013). For this paper, a law enforcement agency is defined as a “government agency 
whose primary function is the enforcement of applicable federal, state, and local laws and whose 
compensated law enforcement officers have the powers of arrest and apprehension” (DLA 2020).  
Sample.  
Methods for selecting units of observation. 
News Source.  
Once the population centers were chosen, the author identified seven newspapers 
operating in the identified areas (figure 1). Key requirements included: reciprocal cities on either 
side of the border, publications available in English and Spanish, with online access to articles. 
For the western portion of the border, the author chose El Sol de Tijuana and Zeta Investigative 
News to represent Tijuana Mexico and The San Diego Union-Tribune to represent San Diego 
California. El Sol publishes daily news for residents and Zeta Investigative is investigative 
broadcasting. Of the two, Zeta Investigation returned 80% of article searches in Spanish. Most 
Spanish articles returned by El Sol were referencing Police Militarization and direct notices from 
the Mexican Government. Unfortunately, the website took 10 minutes to load article searches 
which impact user-friendliness. The San Diego Union-Tribune is very user-friendly but included 
reporting at the national and world levels.  
For the middle of the border, there were not as many options available to choose from. 
the author chose Nogales International to represent Nogales Sonora, and Nogales Arizona. 
During the author’s research, the author found that this newspaper to be comprehensive with two 
divisions of reporters targeting separate, specific audiences. Following the research, the author 
found that, when searched, most articles were returned in English format first and very few 
returned in Spanish format. One downside to the website is that due to the sheer number of 
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articles available and the comprehensiveness of the reporting. As a result, many of the article 
searches were cross-referenced and could not be attributed to a single topic. This is beneficial in 
determining area focus but is notated in limitations for a single statistical approach. 
For the eastern part of the border, the author chose El Dario to represent Ciudad Juarez 
and both the El Paso Times and The El Paso Herald to represent El Paso Texas. the author 
intended to provide a wide range of data points in which to gather representative data and allow 
for patterns to emerge. The author found that the El Dario website not user-friendly, free, does 
not index previous opinion entries, and is limited in results due to high volume. The El Paso 
Times did not give dates in the search results and required the opening of each article. It also 
limited search results to 100 returns. 
Timelines. 
After the identification of news sources, the author created six timelines and two data 
sets. The purpose of the timelines is to provide a solid knowledge base in which to then look at 
the authors data and provide deeper analysis.  
The first timeline the author created is the “Mexico Historical Timeline” (Figure 2) to 
familiarize the author with how Mexico came to be the country we know today. Also, it 
highlighted areas of support and contention with the United States. This was useful in the 
author’s analysis because it provided a window into how legislation sculpted Mexico on a large 
scale as well as identified any events/legislation that may have resulted in increased cartel 
militarization 
The second timeline the author created is the “United States-Mexico Legislative History” 
(Figure 1). The author included immigration, militarization (LE and Cartel), and the “war on 
drugs” acts. To highlight administrational goals, the author included Presidential administrations 
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as well. By generating a list of all legislation referencing legislation, the author was able to 
generate points in time that the author could then cross-reference to open-source news articles to 
analyze for community and cartel reactions. This is beneficial in the author’s analysis due when 
comparing spikes in reporting to legislative commencement. 
The third timeline the author created is the “Evolution of the Cartels in Mexico”. the 
author knew the author needed to understand how the cartels have evolved from their inception. 
The purpose of this timeline was to notate the growth of the cartels, look at the violence inflicted, 
as well as any incidents that supported the militarization of the syndicates. This is beneficial in 
the author’s analysis because it showed the beginning of militarization, any spikes in reporting, 
and where the cartels stand today. Overall, the author was able to cross-reference criminal 
actions and use of militarized gear with documented legislation implementation as well as 
historical aspects of Mexico. 
The fourth timeline the author created is the “Operations Timeline”. This timeline 
showed me major U.S.- Mexico operations that impacted the Cartels. The purpose of this is to 
research the results of the operations as well as how they impacted the cartels. When looking at it 
in analysis, the author would reformat the operation in the terms “the operation (insert operation 
name), led by (Country), against (name of the cartel), resulted in (action), showing that the cartel 
had (equipment). This is a sign of the cartel’s militarization currently. 
The fifth and sixth timeline the author created is the “Border Militarization Timeline” and 
“The United States Law Enforcement Militarization Timeline”. These timelines allowed the 
author to see the legislation's impacts in real-time and cross-reference actions to the increase in 
cartel and law enforcement militarization. To do this, the author also had to research the history 
of the Border Patrol and utilization of the 1033 Program. 
80 
 
The first data set was the identification of the Cartels in Mexico. This served as an in-
depth supplement to the third timeline. The second data set was the identification and description 
of Federal agencies both in the United States and Mexico. Doing this before the author’s research 
allowed me to be familiar with the agencies mentioned in the articles as well as the ability to 
organize the agencies in an easy-to-reference document. 
Sampling Frame 
Once the author’s timelines and data sets were generated, the author begin gathering 
statistical data. To do this, the author established a sampling frame. The author knew that the 
sampling frame must begin in a manner that went from the big picture to terms relevant to the 
author’s research. To do this, the author designated twenty-eight English words with their 
Spanish counterparts, two English words without designated Spanish counterparts, and four 
uniquely Spanish terms to describe the same action within a cultural context to generate a scale 
of discussion by the news source.  
The author began with the eleven broad terms listed in table 1. The purpose of these 
terms was to capture the extent of discussion concerning the overall topics. The Spanish 
counterparts were directly translated. To identify the broad topics, the author considered the 





Following establishment of the broad topics, the author then created subcategories of 
terms, totaling 61 terms (Table 1) to narrow discussion and results in a manner that would 
provide sufficient data to analyze in terms of themes, rationale, and relation to the identified 
news areas. The author chose these terms based on the purpose of legislation and the intended 
result. For example, legislation concerning the border addresses border security, border 
crossings, and utilizes border walls. The Spanish counterpart was directly translated. The term 
“Barrera México–Estados Unidos” was how the border wall was addressed in Mexico and the 
term “Militarización del cartel” and Militarización del Policía” was the Spanish equivalent in 
linguistic terms. 
For the author’s research purpose, the author identified nine terms that were indicative of 
the definition of militarization. These referenced the literature reviews discussion of equipment, 
tactics, and weaponry. Utilizing these terms and their synonyms (during coding) (Table 1), the 
author was able to differentiate militarization within the articles. A fictional example of the 






























Following the statistical data gathering, the author cross-referenced the previous 
timelines and the author searched the broad terms (table 1), the subcategories and the identified 
militarization terms directly from the seven identified news sources websites (table 2). Since the 
author operationalized militarization using terms referencing equipment, tactics, and weaponry, 
the author focused on articles that indicated militarization such as the results from the term 
“tactical vest” (table 3).  
This resulted in researching a total of 61 terms with 21 terms directly chosen as the 
author’s sampling base for militarization (table 3). There were a combined total of 23,938,704 
searches returned. 3,151,308 of these searches came from the San Diego California, Tijuana 
Mexico area, 19,622 from the El Paso Texas, Ciudad Juarez Mexico area, and 729 from the area 
of Nogales Arizona, and Nogales Mexico. 
The author then began to examine news articles in the context of the newspapers’ 




(i.e.: Nogales AZ and Nogales Mexico) as well as the availability of a Spanish counterpart1 
immediately across the border. The newspapers located within the United States spoke to the 
English population, the newspaper in Spanish and the newspapers on the Mexico side of the 
border reported to the Mexican population. The terms chosen for the article pull spoke directly 
on actions (both by the cartel and Law Enforcement) and multiple search terms mentioned 
militarization directly (table 3). Due to this, the author was able to gather the frequency of 
mentions in the author’s analysis. The author also coded for direct support or opposition to 
militarization by operationalizing through use of statements such as “beneficial to the area”, 
“excited to make progress”, “detracts from the real issue”, or “decreased reliability”. 
Measurement Instruments. 
Articles. 
To pull for coding, the author used the identified militarization terms (table 3). They 
conducted individual searches of each of the seven newspapers (table 2) online websites. They 
only utilized the terms list in table 3. 
This resulted in a total of 61 key terms being searched on the seven websites resulting in 
a total of 497 searches in which to gather articles. At each search, the author notated the entire 
number of search results that the website found, the type of articles returned if available, and the 
timeframe the articles covered. From this, if the results were less than 100, and the website 
provided a means to do so, the author further broke down the articles by year. Ex: Nogales 
International, Term: Tactical Vest/ Chaleco Táctico. Resulting searches found: 17/0/ Tactical 
 
1 In regards to language proficiency, the author did not have recent, formalized, tested language proficiency (such as 
the DLAB administered by the Federal Government). However, the author does have 10 years of formalized educational cultural 




Vest further broken down by year: 2005(2), 2008(3), 2009(1), 2011(1), 2014(3), 2015(2), 
2017(1), 2018(2), 2019(2).  
Conducting frequency analysis allowed the author to highlight the importance of each 
term to that region. This indicates the discussion of topics of interest. In the San Diego area, 
cartels were discussed twice the amount of the discussion in Nogales Arizona. This indicates that 
the area of San Diego has more direct involvement with the topic and that Nogales Arizona 
focuses on something different. In this case, it was immigration. Knowing this allowed the 
author to then identify which subjects were discussed in multiple areas and then cross reference 
to any identified operations or legislation. 
The large to small concept discussed previously (Militarization----Police Militarization---
Cartel Militarization), allowed the author to analyze how each term was being discussed and 
which subject was being emphasized. For example, in the San Diego area, police militarization 
was discussed more than cartel militarization. However, the author found that the reverse was 
true looking at militarization from the Tijuana Mexico sources. This also allowed to the author to 
identify blanket areas of militarization that reference neither police, cartel, or border 
militarization. These “grey zones” are important due to the fact they are being discussed but not 
referenced and could indicate an additional application of militarization not identified in table 3. 
The author then narrowed the articles to sources with 100 results or less. This allowed the 
author to see detailed aspects of what regional areas deemed important for publicization (or not) 
as well as reduce the articles to a manageable level. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach that 
gathered both qualitative and quantitative data, the author researched a total of 61 terms with 21 
terms directly chosen as the author’s sampling base for militarization. There was a total of 
23,938,704 searches returned. 3,151,308 of these searches came from the San Diego California, 
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Tijuana Mexico area, 19,622 from the El Paso Texas, Ciudad Juarez Mexico area, and 729 from 
the area of Nogales Arizona, and Nogales Mexico. 
Coding. 
Following the data pull, the articles were uploaded into Atlas.ti. The author then 
conducted the first reading of the articles. After reading, the author begins coding the articles in 
Atlas.ti and identifying patterns. the author broke the data points into 224 codes with an 
overarching term broken down into subcodes. Example: Weapon: Tactical Vest/ Chaleco Táctico 
or Identity: Cartel: Los Zetas. Also, the author performed "traditional" linguistic analysis (word 
counts, collocation) to analyze how the information being provided was being presented.  
Due to the nature of the bilingual research, the author utilized a dual methods approach. 
First, any articles pulled in Spanish were first read in Spanish to catch subtle cultural nuances 
that are lost within the English language. Then the articles were transcribed into English to 
ensure the author’s interpretation was correct. This was assisted through the narrowing of the 
author’s research to the specific seven newspapers chosen because they provided an English 
article translation due to proximity to the border.  
Methodological Literature 
The author chose to approach their research by utilizing a mixed method, content analysis 
approach, with a systemic analysis of text, including images and symbolic matter. This allowed 
for replicable, valid inferences (Krippendorf, 2004; Weber, 1990). Based on the flexibility of 
content analysis and the ability to be used in qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methods studies, 
this approach allowed for examination of multiple research objectives and questions.  
In reference to the application for this research project, the author was more interested in 
understanding the content examined rather than what the exact content was. An example of this 
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was “how often was a particular word used or not used?”. This then led to the question, “what 
can be inferred from the text that was not directly stated?”. Additional questions included “what 
themes or trends does the data indicate? And “how does the sample population feel about X, Y, 
or Z based on an analysis of the text?”. As a result of the questions asked, journal articles, 
newspapers, and web content, provided an opportunity for examination in order to deduce the 
nature of multiple conversations. 
Content Analysis History 
Content analysis grew in prominence within the 20th century. Prior to this, quantitative 
analysis drove most research projects. Like the discussed literature in chapter two, World War II, 
and the start of the Cold War, created the conditions ripe for the evolution of content analysis 
from a journalism-driven quantitative analysis to an established and codified research method 
with both qualitative and quantitative variants (Krippendorf, 2004). The public and researchers 
wanted answers to questions related to everything from the buying trends of a particular 
demographic to an analysis of Soviet propaganda (Krippendorf, 2004). Berelson (1952) provided 
the first consolidated text about content analysis, and, as a result, its use spread beyond 
newspapers, espionage, and sociology to other disciplines and fields. 
The development of computers and the rise of computer-aided text analysis (CATA) 
further integrated content analysis into mainstream research (Krippendorf, 2004). Researchers 
gained the ability to use a variety of software to reliably process large tracts of text. Recent 
adaptive methods have resulted in computer software that was available to support both 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Ward 2019). 
Computer-aided text analysis works by providing a dictionary in which the software 
processes the text. Alternately, a researcher may create a custom dictionary based on variables 
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relevant to the study (Neuendorf, 2002). The computer may also perform a quantitative analysis 
of word count or a more nuanced “analysis” of textual patterns (Evans, 1996).  An important 
point to remember was that whether the decision to use software or not to aid in the analysis of 
text, all researchers must follow the scientific method and be systematic in their approach. The 
quantitative approach to content analysis requires a deductive method in which a hypothesis was 
formed and valid and replicable inferences may be made from the text (White & Marsh, 2006; 
Krippendorf, 2004). The investigator will choose the data via random, systematic sampling and 
all data will be gathered prior to coding. The researchers will develop the coding scheme a priori, 
and she may re-use existing coding schemes (Ward 2019). The coding objective was to test for 
reliability and validity using statistical analysis (White & Marsh, 2006). 
Just as the author did, a researcher who applies the qualitative content analysis method 
uses an inductive, grounded theory approach where the research questions guide the iterative 
data gathering and analysis (Ward 2019). The investigator uses purposive sampling and may 
continue to gather data after coding has begun (Ward 2019). As themes arise while coding and 
analyzing the data, the researcher will determine the important patterns and concepts, and may 
add additional coding schemes as needed (Ward 2019). This was a subjective method that still 
requires the systematic application of techniques to ensure the credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability of the eventual results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; White & 
Marsh, 2006; Ward 2019). As a result, any results of a qualitative content analysis are subjective 
and descriptive, but are systemically grounded in the themes and concepts that emerge from the 
data. Weber (1990) writes that the best content analyses use both quantitative and qualitative 




Due to the nature of the research, the author chose to use content analysis to gauge users’ 
perceptions of militarization. In doing so, they had to differentiate between manifest versus latent 
content. Two modern applications of latent content analysis are the analysis of sentiment, 
mentioned previously in Kracker and Wang’s (2002) analysis of students’ perceptions of 
research, and Bollen, Mao, and Zeng’s (2010) analysis of Twitter posts to predict the DJIA. In 
both studies, manifest content was examined to determine latent content. Strictly speaking, 
content analysis should only consider manifest content (Berelson, 1952), but leading content 
analysis methodologists such as Neuendorf (2002) and Krippendorf (2004) agree that study 
results obtained via latent analysis of manifest content can produce results that are both reliable 
and valid. However, the researcher who examines latent content must be sure to pay strict 
attention to the issues of reliability and validity to ensure a solid study design (Spurgin & 
Wildemuth, 2009; Ward 2019). 
Analysis. 
For the thematic analysis, the author gathered documents, reduced data into themes 
through a process of creating quotations, coding and condensing data, and the created networks 
and tables through analysis. the author also looked for themes and patterns by then cross-
referencing the years in the assembled timelines, looking for any increases in the discussion on a 
topic. Finally, the author searched the texts for the identified terms, with applicable synonyms 
(table 4). the author then organized the qualitative data into groups.  
Following coding, the author begins the author’s analysis. The author started with the 
statistical data to get a large-scale picture of the areas discussing militarization, how often it was 
discussed, and to what extent it was discussed. This data was then placed into charts and graphs 
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to get a visual picture of the data. For the qualitative analysis, the author identified themes and 
patterns and then re-read the articles for additional coding and connections. 
Techniques.  
In this case, content analysis to analyze qualitative data. Atlas.ti for statistical data.  
Quantitative 
As mentioned previously, the author conducted direct word count, number of times 
mentioned within articles, location counts, etc to gather data for coding. This was enhanced 
using Atlas.ti and Microsoft Excel. 
Qualitative 
The author utilized a grounded approach: where they looked for reoccurring themes and 
content and performed additional coding as needed. Following analysis, the author performed 
cross-verification of statistics and removal of redundant coding 
Table 3 
 
Militarization 1033 Program Narco
Militarización Programa 1033 Tactical Vest
Cartel Militarization Chaleco Táctico
Cartel Militarización Assault Weapon
Militarización del cartel Arma de Asalto
Police Militarization Rocket Launcher
Policía Militarización Lanzacohetes









Conducting frequency analysis allowed the author to highlight the importance of each 
term to that region. This indicates the discussion of topics of interest. In the San Diego area, 
cartels were discussed twice the number of times then Nogales Arizona. This indicates that the 
area of San Diego has more involvement with the topic and that Nogales Arizona focuses on 
something different. In this case, it was immigration. Knowing this allowed the author to then 
identify which subjects were discussed in multiple areas and then cross reference to any 
identified operations or legislation. 
Alliance (84) Ambition (269) Betrayal (33) Collaboration 
(73) 
Violence (530) 
Brotherhood Aim Violation Agreement Duress 
Union Goal Disloyalty Partnership Fury 
Merger Objective Infidelity Unity Rage 
Pact Purpose Mistreatment Teamwork Fierceness 
 Aspiration Molestation Cooperation Upheaval 
 Design Fraud  Turmoil 
Campaign (71) Intent Treachery  Strife 
Canvass Plan Treason  Disturbance 
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Solicit    Beating 
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Safe (138) Discontent (5) Dishonest (31) 
Misuse Foolish Trustworthy Condemnation Corrupt 
Extortion Perilous Mindful Displeasure Crooked 
Dishonesty Reckless Prudent Dissatisfaction Depraved 
Bribery Senseless Watchful Rejection Immoral 
Conspiracy Deadly Careful Displeasure Unjust 
Perversion Destructive Cautious Uneasiness Deceitful 
Evil Detrimental Stable Malcontent Hypocritical 
Immorality Hazardous Harmless Unhappy Superficial 
 Harmful Innocent  Underhanded 
 Precarious Dependable  Unscrupulous 
 Fatal Well established  Devious 
 Hurtful   Insincere 
 Risky    
 Grievous    
 Unsafe    
 Threatening    




The large to small concept (Militarization----Police Militarization---Cartel 
Militarization), allowed the author to analyze how each term was being discussed and which 
subject was being emphasized. For example, in the San Diego area, police militarization was 
discussed more than cartel militarization. However, the author found that the reverse was true 
looking at militarization from the Tijuana Mexico sources. This also allowed the author to 
identify blanket areas of militarization that reference neither police, cartel, or border 
militarization. These “grey zones” are important due to the fact they are being discussed but not 
referenced and could indicate an additional application of militarization not identified. 
Understanding the topic of militarization, in addition to working on ways to reduce its 
impact requires creative thinking and understanding the issue from multiple points of view. This 
means that a researcher should consider the cultural, societal, secondary effects, to fully embrace 
what it means to be institutionalized. A unique way of thinking about it to consider militarization 
as an enforcement tool that creates a perpetual cycle. First, Militarization is a policy that attempts 
to addresses deviance. It does this by utilizing the policy that has its origin in “state” efforts to 
maintain social control/social order. Deviance creates crime, crime creates deviance. Actors want 
to decrease both crime and deviance. Strategies over the years have resulted in the militarization 
of law enforcement through legislation. This legislation/militarization has secondary impacts, 
such as the cartels militarizing to meet the threat. This mirrors the perpetual cycle of crime and 
deviance. In essence, we create the issue by trying to fix the issue. We then must increase our 
efforts to address the new issue that we created, repeating the cycle. To further elaborate, the 
authors argument can be boiled down to “Laws create crime, crime influences/creates laws”.  
Selected research supports the fact that legislation was created to address deviance (in 
this case, drugs) and made crimes of acts that were legal up until this point (working in the U.S. 
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by day, returning to Mexico by night). Once this was made illegal (or more difficult), laws were 
created to address the “rising number of people trying to come to the U.S. This then created more 
“deviants” that influenced harsher laws (Militarization, which spread to the institutionalization of 
social, political, economic aspects). This means that the standard quantitative approach would 
not gather the cultural aspects of how cartels came to be, the influence and the vacuum they 
create through violence, and the effect on the population both directly and indirectly. 
As a result, the design of the research included an exploratory, mixed methods, content 
analysis approach with open-source data to see how militarization was being discussed. In 
addition, it strengthens the quantitative approach by not only discussing the “what” but by 
exploring the “why” which opens the subjective matter that results due to creative thinking in 
ways that will affect future policy. In my argument, the author makes the claim that 
Militarization, on all fronts, is a protective perpetuating cycle that requires a different approach 
to break. To do this, the author grounded any qualitative analysis in quantitative data, whether 
that was word count, times mentioned, etc. The result is that future researchers can build on the 
thought process and approach the issue from multiple angles, taking various viewpoints 




Chapter 5 Research Findings 
Utilizing a mixed-methods approach that gathered both qualitative and quantitative data, 
the author researched a total of 61 terms with 21 terms directly chosen as the author’s sampling 
base for militarization. There was a total of 23,938,704 searches returned. 3,151,308 of these 
searches came from the San Diego California, Tijuana Mexico area, 19,622 from the El Paso 
Texas, Ciudad Juarez Mexico area, and 729 from the area of Nogales Arizona, and Nogales 
Mexico. 
Statistical Data 
After coding and analysis, the author’s quantitative data showed that Baja California 
(37%) and Arizona (31%) were discussed more than California (7%), Sonora (8%), Chihuahua 
(7%), Texas (9%). Of the latter, it was found that they were discussed relatively the same. 
Overall, San Diego and Tijuana accounted for 55% of the coded articles.  
This emphasis is important because it showcases the different concerns of the areas. It 
highlights the variances that mirror activity on the border. For example, when breaking down the 
discussions, the less populated Arizona area did not focus so much on the militarization of cartels 
but when mentioning militarization, they discussed the militarization of the border (1%) more 
than militarization of police/cartels. In contrast, the Baja California region is known for cartel 
activity and reports the news that interests/impacts the population (42%). However, a distinct 
difference in the manner of reporting started to emerge when examining data written in Spanish 
vs. data written in English. The data presented by Spanish reporters were more personal and 
informal due to the cultural differences in the language. The English reporters presented data in a 
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manner that if a person is not interested in reading it, it would be easy to skip over. By making it 
personal, the author found that many of the comments by readers further related the situation in a 
manner that gave personal examples. As a reader, the author was able to empathize with the 
stories that commenters posted. In contrast, typical comments in the English versions tended to 
offer complaints and give suggestions for improvement. This could be a useful tool for 
researchers as they try to address future policy implications. 
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On the further breakdown, out of the 23,938,704 articles returned, 3,754,225 referenced 
militarization or one of the 21 predetermined terms. Out of these, 833 were available for coding, 
and 533 (14%) were coded (figure 6). 
Figure 6 
Out of the 533 articles coded (figure 7), 35% came from the news source Zeta, 27% from 
El Diario, 17% from El Paso Herald, 16% from Nogales International, 5% from San Diego 
Union-Tribune, and 0% from El Sol. 
86%
14%
Total Number of Articles




Out of the articles referencing the preset terms concerning militarization (Figure 8), 85% 
came from the San Diego Union-Tribune, 7% came from El Sol, and 7% from Zeta. The 
remaining 1% was split between El Paso Times, El Diario, and El Paso Herald. This means that 
the area of El Paso has a different focus than San Diego due to the primary discussion being 
immigration and narcotics trafficking. Some common reasons that an article was not used were 
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When comparing the area of discussion with the cartel mentions (Figure 10) we find that 
the cartels' discussion was greater in the San Diego and Tijuana areas. This corresponds with 
earlier data on the relevance to the area.  
Figure 10 
Within the mention of cartels in the articles, the cartel most discussed was the Sinaloa 





Out of the 661 articles directly mentioning a federal agency (figure 12), 75% referenced 
border patrol, 22% referenced the Mexican Federal Police, 2% referenced the Mexican Federal 
preventative Police, 1% referenced the DEA, and the remaining percentages mentioned the 
United States Army. This could mean that the federal agencies most impacting the areas and the 
legislation that directly affects the three areas involves the Border Patrol. This can be an 
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The author found that 89% of the legislation mentioned in the pulled data directly refers 
to DACA (figure 13), however, this was only 33% of all references to legislation mentioned in 
the sampling frame. Out of this, 59% of legislation was mentioned indirectly (Figure 14) and 
therefore not named. This corresponds to an increase in legislative discussion over the years and 
shows the importance to the area. For example, the emphasis on DACA over the 1033 program 
shows that the concept that enables militarization was discussed less than immigration. This 





In contrast and looking at the big picture, legislation discussed indirectly (figure 14) 
shows that people believe that legislation was an avenue for addressing both issues. This 
identified and referenced avenue can be utilized to both gain support for immigration and 
militarization changes. 
When referencing operations (figure 15), 29% references police, 25% references cartels, 
19% references the military, and 27% references the federal level. This is important because it 
shows that the discussion revolving around impact is thorough and not directed at one source the 
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Finally, when combining the information analyses (figure 17), you can see that legislation 
and operation have a direct influence on the rate of discussion and saturation of information. This 
trend continues to reference past experiences when discussing current situations which would 
prove beneficial to policymakers in drafting future policy. It also shows the investment of the 
community in looking for and adapting to change. 
Qualitative Data 
During the thematic analysis, the author found that the overarching theme is protection 
(Table 4). Whether it is protection from cartels, protection of supply routes, or protection of a 
nation, it seems that the intent of everyone is self-justifying. Another interesting theme that 
emerged is the emphasis of operations over investigations. This mirrors the proactive nature of 
militarization and supports the protection aspect of the research. The years 2012 and 2020 
emerged as the most discussed and it was during this timeframe that DACA/DAPA legislation 
was introduced. The preferred militarized weapons discussed were the AK-47 and grenades. 
There was some discussion of Operation Gunrunner and the impact that the United States had by 
allowing weapons into Mexico. This suggests, and the author would argue, that the cartels 
militarized to protect themselves from the pace of law enforcement/border militarization.  
Table 5 
Discussion 
The purpose of the research was exploratory. When looking at both the quantitative and 
qualitative data, combined with the literature review and historical timelines, the author 
discovered that pace of the militarization of crime syndicates along the southern United States 
border kept pace with the legislative pace of the militarization of law enforcement in the United 
Action Word Report (People want to discuss the issue) 
Most Mentioned News Source Zeta (investitive source) 




States. However, surprisingly, the cartels began formally militarizing before the United States, 
possibly due to the influence from the Medellín Cartel and Columbia.  
This pace can be traced through discussion of news sources. The adoption of “narco” tanks, 
grenades, body armor, and use of tactics such as ambushes and tunnels, resulted in the increasing 
dominance of the cartels within Mexico and the increasing influence within Mexican government 
agencies and the United States. This then created a power vacuum in which the Mexican 
government currently lacks legitimacy and is undermined by corruption and the inability to 
control local level governments from releasing control of areas to cartels. 
There is a positive relationship between police militarization in the United States on 
crime syndicates in Mexico. Within the scope of the author’s research, cartels militarized in 
response to legislation passed by the United States and operations conducted by both countries. 
The suggestion that the cartels militarized to protect themselves from the pace of law 
enforcement/border militarization is concerning because just as we create crime when we create 
laws, the militarization of the cartels will continue to match or outpace the United States unless 
policymakers can address the root cause of the issue.  
As shown through the Mexico Historical literature review in chapter two, there are two 
main factors in the rise of militarized crime syndicates. First, socioeconomic factors, such as 
economic growth, unemployment, inequality, and poverty. Second, institutionalized dynamics, 
such as the change in Mexico’s political regime and the resulting decline in the State–organized 
crime nexus (Guadalupe, Keck, and Nava 2015). These factors have assisted in creating a 
vacuum that has been actively filled by growing crime syndicates that have quickly adapted 
militaristic ways to take advantage of the situation. 
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In some regions of Mexico, cartels, through militarization have gained access to the 
institutional as well as the social fabric of entire regions (Guadalupe et al. 2015). They have 
created communities where the power of the State, if not supplanted, is shared (Guadalupe et al. 
2015). In certain regions of the country, this situation has effectively weakened the stance of the 
government not only in the eyes of the criminal groups but also in the eyes of the population, 
reducing the State to a political facade while the real power is exerted by private individuals 
(Guadalupe et al. 2015). This gave rise to a large network of crime syndicates that adapted to the 
methods used against them and adopted paramilitary tactics and equipment (militarized). 
In some regions of the country, especially along the border region, through the usage of 
these new tactics and based primarily on the exercise of extreme violence and military 
techniques, organized crime has functioned as an alternative state (Guadalupe et al. 2015). At the 
same time, these new paramilitary criminal syndicates have been able to corrupt state, local, and 
even federal law enforcement authorities (Guadalupe et al. 2015).  
Implication of Findings 
The increasing militarization of cartels is primarily a protective reaction against the efforts 
of the United States and the Mexican government to take on the cartels and battle the organized 
crime, corruption, and violence that comes with the illegal drug trade. Also, it is a result of 
competition among the traffickers themselves to control constricted territories and smuggling 
routes. Ultimately, they seek to protect a very lucrative criminal livelihood. To do this, they 
utilize violence as a primary tool. However, with the increasing legislative restrictions place by 
both governments, the recent violence in Mexico between drug cartels has risen to 





As the cartels continue to militarize, the fear, violence, and oppression they inflict will 
lead more and more migrants to seek refuge within the United States. Addressing this issue will 
require cooperation between the United States and Mexico. For the economic impact, joint 
efforts must be made to establish legitimacy within the Mexican government at all levels. Until 
the Mexican government can gain legitimacy and aid with the population to provide for 
themselves in a manner that will decrease the ability of the cartels to influence and bribe officials, 
the militarization will continue. Continued corruption will lead to an increase in violence and 
trafficking across the border. Allocation of resources must be re-examined in a manner that 
removes the base for the cartels' influence. By doing this, joint efforts will decrease and possibly 
remove the power vacuum that allows cartels to flourish in Mexico.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
Overall, as shown through this research, there is an indication that as law enforcement 
militarized, local crime syndicates utilized their situational advantage and began to mimic law 
enforcement militarization (Michalowski 2020). In particular, the years 2001-2018, saw an 
increase in the use of militarization methods by the cartels (Booth 2011; Bunker 2013). 
Consequently, the deployment of military personnel, machinery, and tactics by both sides of the 
border “reframed immigration control as war-fighting, and migrants as the enemy” (Michalowski 
2020).  
This is not a new phenomenon. Militarization has been a part of law enforcement culture 
within the United States since the 1960’s. Originally traced back to the formation of SWAT, law 
enforcement militarization was strengthened through legislation such as the 1033 program and 
then applied to the southern border as a response to increased concerns about drug trafficking 
and unauthorized immigration in the 2000s.  
In 2016, six million people lived near the US‐Mexico border, while urban centers along 
the east and west coasts of the United States represented the largest population corridors in the 
United States (Rosa 2016). Militarizing one side of a border saw consequences on the other side 
(CITE). As a result of recent changes to immigration policy within the United States and 
Mexico, crime syndicates responded by become organized, assigning distant regional areas of 
control, establishing networks, and trafficking routes, procuring military weapons from the U.S., 
and employing the same tactics as law enforcement (Congressional Research Service 2019). In 
order words, they militarized. 
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This changed how the groups interacted on numerous levels. In the past, the older, large 
groups tended to be hierarchical, often bound by familial ties and led by hard-to-capture cartel 
kingpins (Congressional Research Service 2019). They have been replaced by flatter; more 
nimble organizations that tend to be loosely networked. Far more common in the present crime 
group formation is the outsourcing of certain aspects of trafficking (Congressional Research 
Service 2019). The various smaller organizations resisted the imposition of norms to limit 
violence. The growth of rivalries among a greater number of organized crime “players” has 
produced continued violence, albeit in some cases these players are “less able to threaten the 
state and less endowed with impunity (Congressional Research Service 2019). Increasing 
violence, intimidation of Mexican politicians in advance of the 2018 elections, and assassinations 
of journalists and media personnel continued to raise alarm (Congressional Research Service 
2019).  
Recently, there have been two main factors in the rise of militarized crime syndicates. 
First, socioeconomic factors, such as economic growth, unemployment, inequality, and poverty. 
Second, institutionalized dynamics, such as the change in Mexico’s political regime and the 
resulting decline in the State–organized crime nexus (Guadalupe, Keck, and Nava 2015). These 
factors have created a vacuum that has been actively filled by growing crime syndicates that 
have quickly adapted militaristic ways to take advantage of the situation. 
Crime syndicates, facing increasing militaristic methods responded through a protective 
theme by adapting their methods, equipment, and tactics to mirror those used against them. 
These policies and actions have resulted in the increasing militarization of both the law 
enforcement and local crime syndicates along the U.S -Mexico border. A separate empirical 
question could be addressed in that unless direct action is taken to curb law enforcement 
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militarization, the upward trend will continue and primarily affect those communities on the 
southern border. 
Utilizing qualitative and quantitative data, the author found that the pace of militarization 
of the local crime syndicates along the U.S -Mexico border mirrored the militarization of law 
enforcement both within the United States and Mexico. The militarization by law enforcement 
through legislation suggest that the crime syndicates, facing increased militaristic methods, 
adapted their methods, equipment, and tactics to mirror those used against them. This indicates a 
self-perpetuating cycle of rising enforcement and increased militarization that affects the 
exploitation of border communities by crime syndicates. 
This research was conducted utilizing an exploratory, mixed-method, content analysis, 
approach. The research data is comprised of open-source news data focused on the militarization 
of law enforcement and the Mexican cartels during the thirty years from 1990-2020. The 
research focused on determining: 
1. How, when, and at what pace did police militarize in the United States?  
2. How, when, and at what pace did cartels militarize in Mexico? 
3. How does the pace of local United States law enforcement compare to the pace of the 
cartels. 
4. What is the relationship, if any, between the two. 
5. How have both police and cartel militarization been framed in the media? 
Due to the size of the southern border, the research is tailored to the militarization in the 
areas of Tijuana Mexico, Nogales Mexico, and Ciudad Juarez Mexico, in response to the 
militarization of law enforcement in the adjourning cities of San Diego California, Nogales 
Arizona, and El Paso Texas. The justification for these areas is that they had a U.S.-Mexico 
population counterpart to provide quantitative and qualitative data. This allowed research 
gathering from multiple points of view. 
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The authors data and methods allow the author to speak to the frequency and location of 
binational news coverage of police and cartel militarization on the US Mexico border. It also 
allows the author to speak to the “ways” in which border militarization are discussed. Through 
mixed methods, content analysis, the author has mapped this news discourse in connection with 
time, place, and policy. However, this research alone does not allow for causal claims about 
cartels militarizing in direct response to police militarization but rather indicates that there are 
clear correlations. This hypothesis is supported by existing literature. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest this maybe happening. However, further research is needed to arrive at such a causal 
claim. 
All in all, facing the current climate and the push for demilitarization, cartels have an 
enormous advantage in the border communities and legislation must be careful to slowly reduce 
militarization in ways that prevent any area of exploitation within the border communities that 
the cartels can use to expand their influence. With that in mind, this research provides a unique 
opportunity for policymakers to examine the way they deal with the cartels. It must become a 
joint effort through strict vetting processes to reduce cartel influence, build the legitimacy of the 
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